
| ID | 40535 |
| JaLCDOI | |
| Sort Key | 2
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| フルテキストURL | |
| 著者 | |
| 抄録 | We investigate R&D behavior of public firms by using oligopoly models with Cournot−type−quantity and Bertrand−type−price competition. Then the following results are obtained. When public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in quantity competition, (i) the public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in a public monopoly market than in that market if they are substitutes, and (ii) the public firm has a less incentive to invest in R&D in the oligopoly market if they are complements. Furthermore, suppose that public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in price competition. (i) If the products are complements, then a public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market; and (ii) if they are substitutes, then the public firm has a less incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly
market.
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| 備考 | 論説 (Article)
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| 出版物タイトル |
岡山大学経済学会雑誌
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| 発行日 | 2005-03-10
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| 巻 | 36巻
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| 号 | 4号
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| 出版者 | 岡山大学経済学会
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| 出版者(別表記) | The Economic Association of Okayama University
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| 開始ページ | 15
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| 終了ページ | 27
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| ISSN | 0386-3069
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| NCID | AN00032897
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| 資料タイプ |
学術雑誌論文
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| OAI-PMH Set |
岡山大学
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| 言語 |
英語
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| 論文のバージョン | publisher
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| NAID | |
| Eprints Journal Name | oer
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