R&D, Privatization, Public Monopoly, Mixed Oligopoly, and Productive Efficiency

We investigate R&D behavior of public firms by using oligopoly models with Cournot−type−quantity and Bertrand−type−price competition. Then the following results are obtained. When public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in quantity competition, (i) the public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in a public monopoly market than in that market if they are substitutes, and (ii) the public firm has a less incentive to invest in R&D in the oligopoly market if they are complements. Furthermore, suppose that public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in price competition. (i) If the products are complements, then a public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market; and (ii) if they are substitutes, then the public firm has a less incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market.

論説 (Article)