石油危機勃発後の1973年引締め―『日本銀行百年史　第六巻』の叙述について―

Following another paper of mine* devoted to the analysis of the credit sqeeze in 1973 before the Oil Crisis, this paper deals with the developement of the sqeeze after the Oil Crisis. The main purpose is to compare the analysis of this paper with that of The Hundred Years of the Bank of Japan, vol. 6 (1986). Main concluding remarks are as follows. 1 The recession after the Oil Crisis is mainly due to both the shrinkage of real-term consumption as the natural result of rapid inflation and the decline of willingness to invest. The latter, the decline of investment, is due to the anxiety about the high-cost of oil and the difficulty to secure it. The Hundred Years does not mention the above. 2 The Hundred Years discusses only little about the effect of the reversed exchange control policy upon the improvement of overall balance of payments, whereas this paper attaches great importance to the mixed effect of reversed exchange control since Nov. 1973 and the raising of the Bank Rate by 2% in Dec. 1973. 3 As to the reason why the 9% Bank Rate had been maintained until April 1975, this paper infers, with a few indirect evidences, that it was necessary for the Bank, particularly, to retain, for some time, short- term foreign capital in the hands of foreign exchange banks to tide over the foreign currency reserves crisis since the fourth quarter of 1973. With regards to this question, The Hundred Years stresses only the significance of maintaining 9% to bring rapid inflation to a close. It does not mention the relation between the keeping of 9% and the international movement of money capital. *Atsushi Ichinose, The Credit Squeeze of 1973 before the Oil Crisis, Shikoku Gakuin Shakaikagaku Nenshi (Journal of Social Science), No 6,1996

論説 (Article)