岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30694722016EUの地域政策と地域間協力の進化151ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/54143No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30694632015一汽轎車における生産システムの進化：中国における外来生産システムの適用と適応の事例125ENLiangHanKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/53187No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30694612014スペインにおける失業問題と労働市場改革4768ENAkinobuHatakeyamaKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/52735No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30694432012一汽轎車におけるトヨタ生産方式による改善活動7391ENLiangHanKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/49031No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30692441993戦後日本における賃金決定のレギュラシオン様式（I）109138ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/41825No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30692541994トヨティズム的賃金決定様式―事例研究―241263ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/41786No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30692531994両大戦間期におけるフランスの蓄積体制と大恐慌の性格づけについて―レギュラシオン派をめぐる一論争―201219ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/41758No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-3069251-21993戦後日本における賃金決定のレギュラシオン様式（II）191224ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/41742No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30692721995トヨタ自動車における労働の人間化（II）6183ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/41675No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30692711995トヨタ自動車における労働の人間化（I）124ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/41665No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30693041999現場が作る組立ライン(II)―田原第1組立工場の事例―303331ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/41574Since the beginning of 1990 s, Toyota has been pursuing a new direction in its human resource management and assembly work. After encountering a labor crisis-labor shortage and high turn over of young workers-during the economic boom provoked by the "financial bubble" toward the end of 1980 s, Toyota's management and Union discussed
ways of making the work more attractive. Based on this discussion, the production engineering division developed a new assembly line concept realized firstly at Toyota Kyushu plant (1992), applied also to Toyota's Motomachi No.2 plant (1994), Tahara No.1 plant (1995) and Motomachi No.1 plant (1996). Among these plants, the construction of the assembly line at Tahara No.1 Plant constitutes a unique case in the fact that it was not the production engineering division, but the foremen, supervisors and engineers belonging to the plant who conceived and constructed this new assembly line. Moreover, in order to realize what they considered as their ideal assembly line, they proposed to the product development center an important change of car structure and parts design from the very beginning of product development where the so called "concurrent engineering" has started. The second part of this paper deals with the 'Kaizen' activities in order to realize their "ideal assembly line" after construction. In the concluding section, I emphasize the fact that the
'Kaizen' activities at Toyota are now centered on humanization of work certainly without renouncing efforts towards cost reduction.No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30693031999現場が作る組立ライン（I）―田原第1取立工場の事例―125162ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/41550Since the Beginning of 1990 s, Toyota has been pursuing a new direction in its human resource management and assembly work. After encountering a labor crisis-labor shortage and high turn over of young workers-during the economic boom provoked by the "financial bubble" toward the end of 1980 s, Toyota's management and Union discussed
ways of making the work more attractive. Based on this discussion, the production eugineering division developed a new kssembly line concept realized firstly at Toyota Kyushu plant (1992), applied also to Toyota's Motomachi No.2 plant (1994), Tahara No.1 plant (1995) and Motomachi
No.1 plant (1996). Among these plants, the construcion of the assembly line at Tahara No. 1 plant constitutes a unique case in the fact that it was not the production engineering division, but the foremen, supervisors and engineers belonging to the plant who conceived and constructed this new assembly line. Moreover, in order to realize what they considered as their ideal assembly line, they proposed to the product development center an important change of car structure and parts design from the very beginning of product development where the so called "concurrent engineering" has started. The first part of this paper explains, and thus why and how they conceived and constructed their own assembly line after presenting this assembly line concept and work orgnaization in this plant.No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30693142000Toyota dans l'histoire153175ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/41516At the end of the 20th century, the Japanese automobile industry is suffering from the long depression of Japanese economy to such an extent
that sorne of Japanese carmakers were not able to survive without cooperating with foreign powerful carmakers. Nissan has been in restructuring under the French managers dispatched by Renault. Suzuki and Isuzu began to reinforce their cooperation with GM, whereas Fuji Heavy Industry (Subaru) and Mitsubishi are searching for their Western partners. It is only Toyota and Honda that seem to be able to compete by themselves on globalized automobile markets. Irony of the history, because until the end of the 1980s all Japanese carmakers were regarded as the most competitive companies of the world by incarnating the 'Lean Production' model whose basic model is the Toyota Production System. This stereotype has to be dismissed, because they have been having neither the same management nor the same strategy. This paper then
tries to show the history of Japanese automobile industry from its very beginning to mid-1990 when the majority of carmakers are facing a crisis. In doing so, it presents the specifie characteristics of Toyota by placing it in the historical perspective.No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30693422002企業システムの進化におけるバイファケーションとイナーシア―自動車産業における事例（II）1936ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/40598No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30693412002企業システムの進化におけるバイファケーションとイナーシア―自動車産業における事例（I）115ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/40593No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30693642005現場管理者が語るトヨタの現場管理−現場管理者の口述記録203222ENKoichiShimizuNo potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30693632004Reorienting Kaizen Activities at Toyota : Kaizen, Production Efficiency, and Humanization of Work125ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/40530One of the widely held opinions about Japanese firms’ high performance suggests that Japanese employees, organized in teams, are making kaizen (continuous improvements) in their own jobs through quality circles or other initiatives such as a suggestion system. But who are these employees? They would have to be blue−collar workers in the Western perception, but the part of their contribution in improving productivity and price cost does not seem exceed 10% of all improvements obtained. Who then brings about the major part of these improvements? Are the kaizen activities carried out without having relation to the company’s profit strategy? If the employees have an objective in their kaizen activities, who provides the objectives? What do these objectives consist of? How are their activities managed? These questions invite us to inquire about a whole
management system of kaizen at Toyota Production System, considered as the basic model of “Lean Production”. But Toyota reoriented its organized kaizen activities toward the construction of more humanized production system during 1990s. This paper then shows this reorientation and the new direction by showing the case of Tahara No.1 plant. Through these discussions, I want to emphasize the importance of organized kaizen activities that group leaders, chief leaders and engineers are carrying out, and also the fact that their activities are now centered not only upon productivity increase but also upon the humanization of work.No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30693742006フランスの自動車産業における35時間労働1335ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/40519The legal weekly working hours in France have been reduced to 35 hours from 2000 by the so called "Aubry’s law" of 1998. After the victory of conservatives in the legislative election in 2002, the conservative government is trying to moderate the regulation of overtime work, stipulated by the Aubry's laws of 1998 and of 2002, in order to make it a dead letter. However, the 35 hours work is not only supported by the public, but also positively accepted by big companies. In this paper, I show the real feature of 35 hours work at the company level, based on my interviews with French carmakers, Renault, Peugeot SA, and Toyota Motor Manufacturing France (TMMF), and on their unions−management agreement about the application of 35 hours law of 1998. The main results of this analysis are as follows. Firstly, the negotiations between unions and management for fixing their agreement were the occasion to revise their industrial relations, because the problem of working hours was the central issue influencing entire life of employees, and have served to stabilize their relations. Secondly, the carmakers positively evaluate the 35 hours law, because the law has allowed the flexibility of work organization, by which they can realize considerable economy of scale. Thirdly, they are receiving the government’s financial aide given to the companies, which have applied 35 hours régime and increased their employment. For these last two reasons, the carmakers are able to lower their unit labor cost in spite of the increase in the hourly wage. At the last analysis, they surely profit from the 35 hours law, and have no reason to object to it.No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama0386-30694042009法と労使関係 −フランスの３５時間労働制をめぐる金属産業の労使間協定とカードル問題−93114ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/14932In 1998, the French socialist Government stipulated the first law on the 35-hour working week, which fixed
the conditions for a company receiving a reduction in social security payments. That is, the company had to
conform working hours to the legal 35 hours a week by concluding a union-management agreement. In this
paper, we show the strategies of the French Employers’ Association of the Metal Industry (UIMM) facing such
a situation by analysing its agreements concluded with unions. The first issue treats the reaction of the UIMM,
which aimed to sidestep the impact of the 35 hours law, but had to make a concession facing the critique coming
from the socialist Government. Second, we explain what the French ‘cadres’ are, and the UIMM’s strategy to
accord a qualification of the cadre to lower hierarchy of managers for assuring sufficient working hours of these
people. This is because the 35-hour working week is not applied to the cadres. Third, we show the modifications
of the union-management agreement after the right-wing Government amending the working hours laws,
stipulated by the left-wing Government. Showing the dynamic relations between laws and union-management
agreements, we can explain the dynamics between the law as a rule of the game and the behavior of the players,
i.e. the employers’ association and the unions, as well as the importance of the union-management relations in
deciding labor conditions even in the France.No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学大学院社会文化科学研究科Acta Medica Okayama1880-8476612008特集 北東アジアにおける地域統合とEUの経験12ENkoichiShimizu10.18926/13313No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama038630693942008フランスにおける失業問題201214ENKoichiShimizu10.18926/OER/12392フランスを含むEU の労働市場は全体として日米に比較して高い失業率で知られている。ユーロスタット（Eurostat）の失業率統計によって１９９５年までのEU 加盟国（１５カ国）の失業率をみると，１９９５年に平均失業率１０％，２５歳未満の若者の平均失業率は２１．３％であり，２００６年の失業率はそれぞれ７．４％と１６．１％であった。同時期についてアメリカ合衆国の失業率は，１９９５年の平均失業率が５．６％，２５歳未満の若者の失業率が１２．１％であり，２００６年ではそれぞれ４．６％と１０．５％であった。１９９０年代以降のアメリカ合衆国の失業率は，EU 諸国以上の高失業率に苦しんだ１９８０年代と比較すれば大きく低下しているが，１９９０年代中頃以降は４〜６％の範囲で循環的に変動し，この水準で安定している。これに対して，EU１５カ国の平均失業率は１９９０年代の後半から低下傾向を示し，かつて「ヨーロッパの動脈硬化（eurosclérose）」を象徴する現象とみなされていた高失業率は解消されつつあるように思われ
る。ところがフランスに注目すれば，平均失業率は１９９５年の１１．１％から２００６年の９．４％へと低下傾向を示しているものの，全期間を通じてEU１５カ国平均よりも高く，しかも２５歳未満の若者の失業率は１９９５年に２８．４％と４人に１人が失業し，２００６年においてもなお２３.３％と５人に１人が失業している。かつてフランス以上の高失業率国家であったスペインの場合，１９９５年には平均失業率が１８．４％，２５歳未満の若者の平均失業率にいたっては３９．７％と高率であったが，２００６年の平均失業率は８．５％，また２５歳未満の若者の失業率も１７．６％と失業問題は大きく改善されている。これに対して，フランスは今や西欧のなかで最も失業率の高い国となり，若者の失業問題は憂慮すべき問題であり続けている。このフランスの第２次世界大戦後の平均失業率の推移については３つの局面を区別することができる。第１の局面は１９５５年から１９７３年までのいわゆる「栄光の３０年」であり，この時期の失業率は１９６５年まで１〜２％で変動し，１９６０年代後半からやや上昇して２％台で変動するようになったが，フランス経済は完全雇用経済であったといえる。第２の局面は第１次石油ショックの影響が労働市場に影響を及ぼすようになった１９７４年末から１９８７年までの時期である。この間，１９７４年の第４四半期に失業率が３％を越え，その後は１９８７年の第４四半期の１０．７％まで，失業率は年々上昇し続け，１９７０年代末より失業が重要な社会経済問題になっていく。第３の局面は，１９８７年以降の局面であり，失業率は景気変動に合わせて変動するようになった。この時期は，平均失業率が１１％を越えていた１９９３−１９９８年の期間と，１９９８年の３５時間労働法によって雇用創出政策が行なわれ，また経済成長率の上昇の効果もあって失業率が低下傾向を示し始めた１９９９年以降の時期を区別することができる。以下，本稿はフランスにおける諸研究にもとづいて，この第２期における失業率上昇の原因（第１節），第３期の１９９０年代の高失業率の原因（第２節），そしてフランスにおける失業の構造的特徴（第３節）を説明することにする。No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学経済学会Acta Medica Okayama038630693822006フランス・スイス国境地域におけるInterreg プログラム2346ENKoichiShimizuSatokoIshida10.18926/OER/12387EU の共同体イニシアティブの１つであるInterreg プログラムの主な目的は，EU 内の国境を挟む地域間の市民レベルでの協力関係を発展させ，国境を越えた地域間統合を進めることであるが，Interregには国境を接するEU 内地域とEU 外地域との間の協力関係を促進するという目的も含まれている。本稿の対象はこの後者のケースに属すフランスとスイスの国境地域におけるInterreg プログラムである。スイス・フランス間のInterreg に関しては，バーゼル国境地域あるいはオーバーライン地方というフランス，ドイツ，スイスの３カ国が接する地域に関する伊東（２００３）と八木・若森（２００６）の研究が存在するが，本稿の対象とする地域に関する研究は存在しない。よって，本稿では，主にInterreg II の『事後評価報告書』（LRDP，２００３a，２００３b）とInterreg IIIA の『中間評価』（Evaluanda，２００３）に依拠して，フランス・スイス間の越境地域間協力の実態を示すことにしたい。なお，本稿が対象とするケースはInterreg プログラムのうち，国境を挟む地域間の協力事業プログラムであり，これは
歴史的に１９９０〜１９９３年のInterreg I，１９９４〜１９９９年のInterreg IIA および２０００〜２００６年のInterreg IIIA へと発展してきている。本稿の対象となる地域のInterreg プログラムは，オーバーライン地方と同様に，EU 内のフランスとEU 外のスイスとの間の越境地域間協力事業である。対象となる地域は，フランス側ではリヨン（Lyon）を中心都市にもつローヌ・アルプ（Rhône−Alps）地域（レジョン）の東北部と，ブザンソン（Besançon）を中心都市とするフロンシュ・コンテ（Franche−Comté）地域の東部であり，スイス側ではバーゼル（Basel）とジュネーヴ（Genève）を結ぶスイス西部のフランス語地域である。よっ
て，この両地域には言語の障害は存在しない。また歴史的には，ジュネーヴはローヌ・アルプ・レジョンのオート・サヴォワ（Haute−Savoie）県との結びつきが強く，ジュネーヴとアンヌマス（Annemasse）は国境を挟んだ大都市圏を発展させている。さらに労働市場を見れば，両地域の経済状態を反映していると言えるが，フランス側からスイス側への越境通勤者が多く（約４万人），経済的結びつきも深いように見える。実際，ピット（２００３）はフランスのトランスボーダー地域の分類において，ジュネーヴ地域をリール地域と並ぶ「国境を越えた隣接地域間に密接な結びつきをもつ地域」に分類していた。ただし，Interreg II の『事後評価報告書』（LRDP，２００３a）によれば，フランス・スイス国境地帯の孤立状態は中程度であるとされており，孤立状態の最も低いオーバーライン地方やフランス・ベルギー国境地帯ほどの緊密な結びつきはない。しかも，フランス・スイス国境地帯
は北部と南部では地理的・歴史的特性が異なり，ジュネーヴを中心としたレマン地域では地域連携が比較的緊密であるのに対して，北部のジュラ山脈という自然の障害をもつジュラ地域ではレマン地域ほど結びつきは強くない。このような地域的特性を反映して，Interreg IIA プログラムでは，ジュ
ラ・プログラムとローヌ・アルプ・プログラムが別々に実施されてきた。よって以下では，Interreg対象地域の地域的特性を説明（第２節）した後に，まずはInterreg IIA のジュラ・プログラムとローヌ・アルプ・プログラムを概観して問題点を示す（第３節）。次いで，両プログラムをサブプログラムに包摂したInterreg IIIA フランス・スイス・プログラムのガバナンス上の特徴と問題点を示すことにする（第４節）。No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学大学院文化科学研究科Acta Medica Okayama1880-8476212005国境を越える地域経済圏の形成 : フランス・ベルギー国境地域におけるINTERREGの事例4160EN10.18926/9060No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.岡山大学大学院文化科学研究科Acta Medica Okayama1880-8476112004Coping with uncertainty : A toyotaization of the Chinese Carmaker Tianjin Xiali217234ENJiRenKoichiShimizu10.18926/9056No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.