

# British Social Attitudes before and after Brexit

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This article attempts to sketch the social situation in the United Kingdom before and after the 2016 referendum wheather to leave or keep the membership of the European Union, using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey series, which has been conducted in the United Kingdom almost annually since 1983 (except 1988 and 1992). The data used here are from the BSA 2015 to 2019, obtained from the UK Data Service. Particular focus is placed on how “Brexit” had been expected to change the UK economy, the social security system, and immigration to the UK, and how these notions have changed.

## 1. Spending priorities and party identification

First, let’s look at respondents’ answers to their top spending priorities in the BSA 2015 data (not their top “policy issues”). The top priority is “health care,” which is ahead of all other spending priorities. Education comes in second, with the rest of the spending categories accounting for almost all of the spending below 10% of the total. The responses for the next most prioritized item appear to be a reversal of this result. Next, a contingency table is created to examine the relationship between these items and party identification. The cells display realized values, expected values, and adjusted standardized residuals. There are large differences by party affiliation in “defense” (Conservative and UKIP supporters are positive, and Labour/SNP

supporters vice versa). Among the top priorities, “education” appears to be more important for Liberal Democrat supporters and less so for UKIP. This may indicate a difference in the educational level of the supporters of the two parties. While “health care” seems to be an important issue regardless of party support, no significant differences by party support can be detected.

The above question on top-priority spending items is asked annually in the BSA, and changes over time can be seen. Figures.1-0 show a line graph of the top-priority spending items (with the lower-priority items omitted), with health care and education consistently at the top. Only in 2019, Police and Prison is in third place, and the percentage of respondents citing medical care has temporarily declined somewhat accordingly. But it will be back to where it had been in 2020.

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra government spending?: Versions A,	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Health	1,709	52.70	52.70
Education	767	23.65	76.35
Housing	261	8.05	84.40
Defence	174	5.37	89.76
Police and prisons	75	2.31	92.08
Help <b>for</b> industry	74	2.28	94.36
Social security benefits	63	1.94	96.30
Roads	59	1.82	98.12
Public transport	48	1.48	99.60
Overseas aid	13	0.40	100.00
Total	3,243	100.00	

Which would <b>be</b> your next highest priority <b>for</b> extra government spending?: Versio	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Education	1,148	35.42	35.42
Health	827	25.52	60.94
Housing	346	10.68	71.61
Defence	230	7.10	78.71
Police and prisons	212	6.54	85.25

Which would <b>be</b> your next highest priority <b>for</b> extra government spending?: Versio	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Help <b>for</b> industry	127	3.92	89.17
Social security benefits	118	3.64	92.81
Roads	112	3.46	96.27
Public transport	97	2.99	99.26
Overseas aid	12	0.37	99.63
(None <b>of</b> these)	12	0.37	100.00
Total	3,241	100.00	

observed **frequency**  
expected **frequency**  
adjusted residual

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra government spending?: Versions A,	Respondent's political party identification							
	0	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	PC	Green	UKIP
Education	112	229	218	47	25	5	34	30
	108.331	246.394	215.970	35.265	21.897	2.996	25.584	43.563
	0.437	-1.569	0.189	2.312	0.768	1.322	1.932	-2.419
Defence	16	94	24	3	0	2	3	22
	25.380	57.727	50.599	8.262	5.130	0.702	5.994	10.206
	-2.082	6.098	-4.623	-1.931	-2.366	1.596	-1.281	3.920
Health	255	574	522	74	43	5	49	91
	249.625	567.763	497.656	81.261	50.456	6.905	58.954	100.381
	0.540	0.475	1.917	-1.207	-1.557	-1.061	-1.929	-1.412
Housing	42	52	95	14	10	1	13	18
	37.916	86.238	75.589	12.343	7.664	1.049	8.955	15.247
	0.752	-4.777	2.800	0.505	0.894	-0.050	1.436	0.759
Public transport	3	21	9	4	2	0	4	1
	6.809	15.488	13.575	2.217	1.376	0.188	1.608	2.738
	-1.599	1.753	-1.504	1.238	0.544	-0.438	1.936	-1.093
Roads	10	23	10	2	4	0	2	5
	8.666	19.712	17.278	2.821	1.752	0.240	2.047	3.485
	0.497	0.929	-2.125	-0.506	1.742	-0.495	-0.034	0.846
Police and prisons	7	33	13	2	3	0	2	12
	11.143	25.343	22.214	3.627	2.252	0.308	2.632	4.481
	-1.366	1.912	-2.379	-0.887	0.512	-0.563	-0.401	3.712
Social security benefits	16	6	24	3	3	0	1	6
	9.131	20.768	18.203	2.972	1.846	0.253	2.156	3.672
	2.497	-4.065	1.650	0.017	0.872	-0.509	-0.810	1.267
Help <b>for</b> industry	6	36	16	4	4	0	1	4
	10.988	24.991	21.905	3.577	2.221	0.304	2.595	4.419
	-1.656	2.768	-1.535	0.232	1.227	-0.559	-1.021	-0.208

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra government spending?: Versions A,	Respondent's political party identification							
	0	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	PC	Green	UKIP
Overseas aid	3	1	6	0	1	0	2	0
	2.012	4.576	4.011	0.655	0.407	0.056	0.475	0.809
	0.759	-2.081	1.197	-0.832	0.947	-0.237	2.259	-0.931

36 cells with expected **frequency** < 5

11 cells with expected **frequency** < 1

Pearson chi2(63) = 194.1941 Pr=0.000

likelihood-ratio chi2(63) = 198.7053 Pr=0.000

observed **frequency**

expected **frequency**

adjusted residual

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra govt spending?: Version C	Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote at next e						
	0	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	Green	UKIP
Item <b>not</b> applicable	274	687	555	107	64	42	97
	267.920	670.135	567.243	106.901	72.158	46.769	94.874
	0.698	1.421	-1.075	0.017	-1.701	-1.226	0.389
Education	23	70	63	19	10	10	3
	29.052	72.665	61.508	11.592	7.824	5.071	10.288
	-1.262	-0.408	0.238	2.329	0.824	2.302	-2.423
Defence	2	21	6	0	0	1	7
	5.429	13.579	11.494	2.166	1.462	0.948	1.922
	-1.604	2.549	-1.965	-1.527	-1.242	0.055	3.787
Health	69	167	179	29	23	12	28
	74.390	186.067	157.498	29.682	20.035	12.986	26.342
	-0.750	-1.947	2.286	-0.143	0.749	-0.307	0.368
Housing	15	19	22	3	4	3	1
	9.831	24.589	20.813	3.922	2.648	1.716	3.481
	1.807	-1.434	0.317	-0.486	0.859	1.005	-1.383
Public transport	2	7	2	0	1	0	0
	1.761	4.404	3.728	0.703	0.474	0.307	0.623
	0.196	1.558	-1.080	-0.866	0.781	-0.563	-0.813
Roads	2	7	5	0	4	0	0
	2.641	6.606	5.592	1.054	0.711	0.461	0.935
	-0.428	0.193	-0.302	-1.061	3.992	-0.690	-0.997
Police and prisons	3	11	4	0	0	0	3
	3.081	7.707	6.524	1.229	0.830	0.538	1.091
	-0.050	1.497	-1.195	-1.147	-0.933	-0.746	1.884
Social security benefits	4	0	7	1	2	1	0
	2.201	5.505	4.660	0.878	0.593	0.384	0.779
	1.316	-2.957	1.309	0.134	1.870	1.009	-0.909

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra govt spending?: Version C	Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote at next e						
	0	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	Green	UKIP
Help <b>for</b> industry	3	11	5	1	0	0	3
	3.375	8.441	7.145	1.347	0.909	0.589	1.195
	-0.222	1.112	-0.971	-0.309	-0.977	-0.781	1.703
Overseas aid	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	0.147	0.367	0.311	0.059	0.040	0.026	0.052
	-0.415	-0.762	1.490	-0.249	-0.203	-0.162	-0.234
(None <b>of</b> these)	4	3	0	0	0	1	0
	1.174	2.936	2.485	0.468	0.316	0.205	0.416
	2.828	0.047	-1.901	-0.706	-0.575	1.782	-0.663

50 cells with expected **frequency** < 5

27 cells with expected **frequency** < 1

Pearson chi2(66) = 124.1105 Pr=0.000

likelihood-ratio chi2(66) = 125.3365 Pr=0.000

observed **frequency**  
expected **frequency**  
adjusted residual

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra govt spending?	Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote at next e							
	0	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	PC	Green	UKIP
Education	37	57	95	19	7	2	5	2
	36.364	72.000	84.606	14.788	4.606	1.455	4.848	5.333
	0.132	-2.466	1.646	1.302	1.295	0.521	0.080	-1.678
Defence	3	27	6	1	0	0	0	4
	6.656	13.179	15.486	2.707	0.843	0.266	0.887	0.976
	-1.584	4.728	-3.126	-1.098	-0.949	-0.530	-0.974	3.169
Health	78	161	190	36	10	3	12	10
	81.169	160.714	188.853	33.009	10.281	3.247	10.823	11.905
	-0.567	0.040	0.156	0.795	-0.131	-0.203	0.534	-0.825
Housing	16	15	31	1	2	0	1	2
	11.039	21.857	25.684	4.489	1.398	0.442	1.472	1.619
	1.695	-1.850	1.382	-1.770	0.534	-0.693	-0.409	0.315
Public transport	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
	0.974	1.929	2.266	0.396	0.123	0.039	0.130	0.143
	0.029	-0.814	-1.070	0.996	-0.356	-0.199	2.449	2.303
Roads	1	5	2	0	0	0	0	1
	1.461	2.893	3.399	0.594	0.185	0.058	0.195	0.214
	-0.419	1.511	-0.967	-0.802	-0.437	-0.244	-0.448	1.726
Police and prisons	4	17	12	1	0	0	0	1
	5.682	11.250	13.220	2.311	0.720	0.227	0.758	0.833
	-0.786	2.122	-0.434	-0.910	-0.874	-0.488	-0.897	0.188

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra govt spending?	Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote at next e							
	0	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	PC	Green	UKIP
Social security benefits	4	1	7	2	0	1	0	0
	2.435	4.821	5.666	0.990	0.308	0.097	0.325	0.357
	1.105	-2.130	0.717	1.059	-0.566	2.925	-0.581	-0.610
Help <b>for</b> industry	3	11	5	0	0	0	0	0
	3.084	6.107	7.176	1.254	0.391	0.123	0.411	0.452
	-0.053	2.429	-1.041	-1.171	-0.638	-0.356	-0.655	-0.688
Overseas aid	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.162	0.321	0.378	0.066	0.021	0.006	0.022	0.024
	2.273	-0.689	-0.779	-0.266	-0.145	-0.081	-0.149	-0.156
(None <b>of</b> these)	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	1
	0.974	1.929	2.266	0.396	0.123	0.039	0.130	0.143
	1.140	0.063	-1.915	-0.653	-0.356	-0.199	2.449	2.303

64 cells with expected **frequency** < 5  
43 cells with expected **frequency** < 1

Pearson chi2(70) = 121.2986      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-**ratio** chi2(70) = 108.4399      Pr=0.002

observed **frequency**  
expected **frequency**  
adjusted residual

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra govt spending?	Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote at next e							
	0	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	PC	Green	UKIP
Education	24	60	70	14	8	1	9	0
	28.107	59.520	70.680	12.400	6.407	0.827	5.787	2.273
	-0.944	0.085	-0.115	0.528	0.719	0.215	1.524	-1.703
Defence	6	18	2	2	0	0	0	2
	4.533	9.600	11.400	2.000	1.033	0.133	0.933	0.367
	0.760	3.344	-3.596	0.000	-1.052	-0.372	-0.998	2.760
Health	73	159	219	30	17	3	11	7
	78.427	166.080	197.220	34.600	17.877	2.307	16.147	6.343
	-1.022	-1.024	3.027	-1.244	-0.324	0.703	-2.000	0.403
Housing	17	14	26	9	2	0	3	0
	10.729	22.720	26.980	4.733	2.446	0.316	2.209	0.868
	2.165	-2.312	-0.250	2.115	-0.302	-0.587	0.563	-0.977
Public transport	2	3	1	1	0	0	0	0
	1.058	2.240	2.660	0.467	0.241	0.031	0.218	0.086
	0.998	0.618	-1.298	0.811	-0.502	-0.177	-0.476	-0.295
Roads	6	3	1	0	2	0	0	0
	1.813	3.840	4.560	0.800	0.413	0.053	0.373	0.147
	3.397	-0.523	-2.132	-0.932	2.528	-0.233	-0.625	-0.388

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra govt spending?	Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote at next e							
	0	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	PC	Green	UKIP
Police and prisons	3	21	11	1	0	0	2	1
	5.893	12.480	14.820	2.600	1.343	0.173	1.213	0.477
	-1.323	2.990	-1.288	-1.050	-1.206	-0.427	0.742	0.780
Social security benefits	3	2	5	3	2	0	2	0
	2.569	5.440	6.460	1.133	0.586	0.076	0.529	0.208
	0.295	-1.806	-0.737	1.832	1.899	-0.278	2.075	-0.463
Help <b>for</b> industry	1	6	6	0	0	0	0	1
	2.116	4.480	5.320	0.933	0.482	0.062	0.436	0.171
	-0.839	0.878	0.377	-1.008	-0.712	-0.252	-0.676	2.032
Overseas aid	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	0.453	0.960	1.140	0.200	0.103	0.013	0.093	0.037
	0.883	0.050	-0.167	-0.464	-0.328	-0.116	-0.311	-0.193
(None <b>of</b> these)	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
	0.302	0.640	0.760	0.133	0.069	0.009	0.062	0.024
	-0.597	0.546	-1.108	-0.378	-0.267	-0.095	3.824	-0.157

64 cells with expected **frequency** < 542 cells with expected **frequency** < 1

Pearson chi2(70) = 120.8954      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-ratio chi2(70) = 109.8037      Pr=0.002

observed **frequency**  
expected **frequency**  
adjusted residual

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra govt spending?	Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote at next							
	None	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	Green	UKIP	Brexit
Skip, <b>version off</b> route	321	653	550	219	50	71	32	66
	333.600	646.393	547.722	222.177	45.644	70.479	32.219	63.767
	-1.321	0.553	0.200	-0.395	1.138	0.110	-0.068	0.496
Education	27	53	53	28	3	9	5	2
	30.606	59.302	50.250	20.383	4.187	6.466	2.956	5.850
	-0.738	-1.032	0.472	1.849	-0.606	1.048	1.238	-1.671
Defence	6	22	3	2	0	1	1	6
	6.971	13.508	11.446	4.643	0.954	1.473	0.673	1.333
	-0.407	2.842	-2.961	-1.312	-0.995	-0.400	0.404	4.140
Health	67	117	124	47	8	15	2	15
	67.162	130.135	110.270	44.730	9.189	14.189	6.486	12.838
	-0.023	-1.512	1.656	0.388	-0.427	0.236	-1.910	0.660
Housing	27	21	31	8	1	5	1	3
	16.493	31.957	27.079	10.984	2.257	3.484	1.593	3.153
	2.888	-2.407	0.903	-0.972	-0.861	0.841	-0.482	-0.089

Which would <b>be</b> your highest priority <b>for</b> extra govt spending?	Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote at next							
	None	Con	Lab	LD	SNP	Green	UKIP	Brexit
Public transport	2	4	8	1	1	0	0	0
	2.720	5.271	4.467	1.812	0.372	0.575	0.263	0.520
	-0.481	-0.678	1.975	-0.642	1.044	-0.774	-0.518	-0.735
Roads	5	11	5	1	2	0	0	1
	4.251	8.236	6.979	2.831	0.582	0.898	0.411	0.813
	0.401	1.181	-0.886	-1.161	1.890	-0.969	-0.649	0.212
Police and prisons	25	56	19	8	0	1	4	1
	19.384	37.558	31.825	12.909	2.652	4.095	1.872	3.705
	1.428	3.749	-2.731	-1.480	-1.681	-1.589	1.600	-1.457
Social security benefits	6	5	16	8	1	0	1	0
	6.291	12.190	10.329	4.190	0.861	1.329	0.608	1.203
	-0.128	-2.531	2.092	1.989	0.153	-1.182	0.511	-1.122
Help <b>for</b> industry	8	21	7	6	2	1	2	1
	8.161	15.814	13.400	5.436	1.117	1.724	0.788	1.560
	-0.063	1.606	-2.076	0.259	0.853	-0.566	1.388	-0.460
Overseas aid	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	0.170	0.329	0.279	0.113	0.023	0.036	0.016	0.033
	-0.453	-0.701	-0.622	-0.357	-0.154	5.181	-0.129	-0.183
(None <b>of</b> these)	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	0
	0.850	1.647	1.396	0.566	0.116	0.180	0.082	0.163
	1.370	-1.569	-1.393	2.025	-0.345	1.973	-0.289	-0.410
Don't know	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	0.340	0.659	0.558	0.226	0.047	0.072	0.033	0.065
	1.243	-0.992	-0.880	1.727	-0.218	-0.273	-0.183	-0.259

Pearson chi2(84) = 168.3741      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-ratio chi2(84) = 151.1434      Pr=0.000

There is some degree of pattern to these differences in policy interests by party affiliation. The 2016 results are basically the same as the previous year, but Labour supporters are significantly more interested in health care; in 2017, Conservative supporters are less interested in education, whereas the significant differences between Liberal Democrat and UKIP supporters from the previous two years have disappeared. The significant differences in 2018, Labor Party supporters are more interested in health care, and the same basic pattern holds for defense, but the difference in interest by party on education disappears. 2019 also shows no difference on health care.






Fig. 1-1

## 2. Expectations about the impact of closer ties with European Union before and after Brexit

If GB left EU: <b>more or less</b> influence?: Version A		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot <b>more</b> influence		48	4.51	4.51
A little <b>more</b> influence		129	12.12	16.64
Wouldn't make much difference		505	47.46	64.10
A little <b>less</b> influence		276	25.94	90.04
A lot <b>less</b> influence		106	9.96	100.00
Total		1,064	100.00	
If GB left EU: higher <b>or lower</b> unemployment?: Version A		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot higher		64	6.13	6.13
A little higher		200	19.16	25.29
Wouldn't make much difference		524	50.19	75.48
A little <b>lower</b>		218	20.88	96.36
A lot <b>lower</b>		38	3.64	100.00
Total		1,044	100.00	
If GB left EU: higher <b>or lower</b> immigration?: Version A		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot higher		15	1.41	1.41
A little higher		70	6.59	8.00
Wouldn't make much difference		357	33.62	41.62

If GB left EU: higher <b>or</b> lower immigration?: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A little <b>lower</b>	393	37.01	78.63
A lot <b>lower</b>	227	21.37	100.00
Total	1,062	100.00	

If GB left EU: better <b>or</b> worse economically?: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot better <b>off</b>	87	8.35	8.35
A little better <b>off</b>	184	17.66	26.01
Wouldn t make much difference	355	34.07	60.08
A little worse <b>off</b>	313	30.04	90.12
A lot worse <b>off</b>	103	9.88	100.00
Total	1,042	100.00	

Looking at the aggregate results for influence, employment, immigration, economic impact, and the outlook for each if the U.K. leaves the EU, half of the respondents thought that influence, employment, and immigration would not change much, and most said that the economy would be about the same or a little worse. As for immigration, it appears that they thought it would be about the same or decrease.

```
-> pwmean EUExInfl, over(PartyIDN) mcompare (scheffe) pv
```

Pairwise comparisons **of means** with equal variances

EUExInfl	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	0.18	0.09	1.90	0.82
Lab vs 0	0.27	0.10	2.80	0.35
LD vs 0	0.64	0.16	3.91	0.03
SNP vs 0	0.37	0.18	2.08	0.74
PC vs 0	0.93	0.94	0.99	1.00
Green vs 0	0.62	0.16	3.85	0.04
UKIP vs 0	-0.41	0.14	-2.94	0.28
Lab vs Con	0.09	0.07	1.28	0.98

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EUEXInfl	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
LD vs Con	0.46	0.15	3.06	0.23
SNP vs Con	0.19	0.17	1.15	0.99
PC vs Con	0.75	0.94	0.80	1.00
Green vs Con	0.44	0.15	2.99	0.26
UKIP vs Con	-0.59	0.12	-4.76	0.00
LD vs Lab	0.36	0.15	2.41	0.56
SNP vs Lab	0.10	0.17	0.59	1.00
PC vs Lab	0.66	0.94	0.70	1.00
Green vs Lab	0.35	0.15	2.33	0.61
UKIP vs Lab	-0.68	0.13	-5.42	0.00
SNP vs LD	-0.26	0.21	-1.23	0.98
PC vs LD	0.30	0.94	0.31	1.00
Green vs LD	-0.02	0.20	-0.08	1.00
UKIP vs LD	-1.05	0.18	-5.78	0.00
PC vs SNP	0.56	0.95	0.59	1.00
Green vs SNP	0.25	0.21	1.17	0.99
UKIP vs SNP	-0.78	0.20	-3.99	0.03
Green vs PC	-0.31	0.94	-0.33	1.00
UKIP vs PC	-1.34	0.94	-1.43	0.96
UKIP vs Green	-1.03	0.18	-5.73	0.00

-> pwmean EUEXUnem, **over**(PartyIDN) mcompare (scheffe) pv

Pairwise comparisons **of means** with equal variances

Over: PartyIDN

	Number <b>of</b> comparisons
PartyIDN	28

EUEXInfl	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	-0.12	0.09	-1.37	0.97
Lab vs 0	-0.12	0.09	-1.31	0.97
LD vs 0	-0.34	0.15	-2.22	0.67
SNP vs 0	-0.64	0.17	-3.81	0.04

EUExInfl	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PC vs 0	-1.08	0.88	-1.23	0.98
Green vs 0	-0.45	0.15	-2.96	0.27
UKIP vs 0	0.24	0.13	1.82	0.85
Lab vs Con	0.00	0.07	0.02	1.00
LD vs Con	-0.22	0.14	-1.56	0.93
SNP vs Con	-0.52	0.16	-3.31	0.14
PC vs Con	-0.96	0.88	-1.10	0.99
Green vs Con	-0.33	0.14	-2.36	0.59
UKIP vs Con	0.36	0.12	3.07	0.23
LD vs Lab	-0.22	0.14	-1.55	0.93
SNP vs Lab	-0.52	0.16	-3.29	0.15
PC vs Lab	-0.96	0.88	-1.10	0.99
Green vs Lab	-0.33	0.14	-2.34	0.60
UKIP vs Lab	0.36	0.12	3.00	0.25
SNP vs LD	-0.30	0.20	-1.47	0.95
PC vs LD	-0.74	0.89	-0.83	1.00
Green vs LD	-0.11	0.19	-0.58	1.00
UKIP vs LD	0.58	0.17	3.37	0.12
PC vs SNP	-0.44	0.89	-0.50	1.00
Green vs SNP	0.19	0.20	0.93	1.00
UKIP vs SNP	0.88	0.19	4.76	0.00
Green vs PC	0.63	0.89	0.71	1.00
UKIP vs PC	1.32	0.88	1.50	0.94
UKIP vs Green	0.70	0.17	4.04	0.02

-> pwmean EUExImm, **over**(PartyIDN) mcompare (scheffe) pv

Pairwise comparisons **of means** with equal variances

Over: PartyIDN

	Number <b>of</b> comparisons
PartyIDN	28

EUExInfl	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	0.22	0.09	2.43	0.55

EUEXInfl	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
Lab vs 0	0.11	0.09	1.11	0.99
LD vs 0	0.22	0.16	1.37	0.97
SNP vs 0	0.22	0.18	1.23	0.98
PC vs 0	-0.55	0.92	-0.60	1.00
Green vs 0	0.02	0.16	0.13	1.00
UKIP vs 0	0.44	0.14	3.14	0.20
Lab vs Con	-0.12	0.07	-1.67	0.90
LD vs Con	-0.01	0.15	-0.03	1.00
SNP vs Con	-0.01	0.16	-0.05	1.00
PC vs Con	-0.77	0.92	-0.84	1.00
Green vs Con	-0.20	0.15	-1.40	0.96
UKIP vs Con	0.21	0.12	1.71	0.89
LD vs Lab	0.11	0.15	0.76	1.00
SNP vs Lab	0.11	0.17	0.67	1.00
PC vs Lab	-0.65	0.92	-0.71	1.00
Green vs Lab	-0.09	0.15	-0.58	1.00
UKIP vs Lab	0.33	0.13	2.62	0.44
SNP vs LD	-0.00	0.21	-0.01	1.00
PC vs LD	-0.77	0.93	-0.83	1.00
Green vs LD	-0.20	0.20	-1.01	0.99
UKIP vs LD	0.22	0.18	1.20	0.98
PC vs SNP	-0.76	0.93	-0.82	1.00
Green vs SNP	-0.20	0.21	-0.94	1.00
UKIP vs SNP	0.22	0.19	1.13	0.99
Green vs PC	0.57	0.93	0.61	1.00
UKIP vs PC	0.98	0.92	1.07	0.99
UKIP vs Green	0.42	0.18	2.32	0.61

-> pwmean EUEXEcon, **over**(PartyIDN) mcompare (scheffe) pv

Pairwise comparisons **of means** with equal variances

Over: PartyIDN

	Number <b>of</b> comparisons
PartyIDN	28

EUExcon	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	0.21	0.11	1.93	0.81
Lab vs 0	0.33	0.11	3.03	0.24
LD vs 0	0.49	0.19	2.62	0.44
SNP vs 0	0.89	0.20	4.38	0.01
PC vs 0	2.07	1.06	1.95	0.80
Green vs 0	0.70	0.18	3.83	0.04
UKIP vs 0	-0.62	0.16	-3.86	0.04
Lab vs Con	0.13	0.08	1.53	0.94
LD vs Con	0.28	0.17	1.63	0.91
SNP vs Con	0.68	0.19	3.60	0.07
PC vs Con	1.86	1.06	1.76	0.88
Green vs Con	0.50	0.17	2.94	0.28
UKIP vs Con	-0.83	0.14	-5.76	0.00
LD vs Lab	0.15	0.17	0.88	1.00
SNP vs Lab	0.56	0.19	2.90	0.30
PC vs Lab	1.73	1.06	1.63	0.91
Green vs Lab	0.37	0.17	2.16	0.70
UKIP vs Lab	-0.95	0.15	-6.53	0.00
SNP vs LD	0.40	0.24	1.67	0.90
PC vs LD	1.58	1.07	1.48	0.95
Green vs LD	0.22	0.23	0.96	1.00
UKIP vs LD	-1.11	0.21	-5.30	0.00
PC vs SNP	1.18	1.07	1.10	0.99
Green vs SNP	-0.19	0.24	-0.77	1.00
UKIP vs SNP	-1.51	0.22	-6.73	0.00
Green vs PC	-1.36	1.07	-1.27	0.98
UKIP vs PC	-2.69	1.07	-2.52	0.50
UKIP vs Green	-1.32	0.21	-6.39	0.00

Multiple comparisons (Scheffe) are used to check the statistical significance of the mean differences by party identification for each response. For influence, the difference in means is only significant between UKIP vs. Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and Greens; for employment, UKIP vs.

Scottish and Greens only; for immigration, UKIP vs. Greens only; and for the economy, UKIP vs. all others. In other words, only UKIP identifiers seemed to believe there would be any hope of leaving the EU.

-> **tab** EUExSure

Are you sure what would happen if GB left EU?: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
I am very sure what would happen	54	5.01	5.01
I am quite sure what would happen	259	24.03	29.04
I am quite unsure what would happen	617	57.24	86.27
I am very unsure what would happen	148	13.73	100.00
Total	1,078	100.00	

-> **tab** ECPolicy

What <b>do</b> you think Britains <b>long</b> -term EU policy should <b>be</b> : Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
to leave the European Union,	252	24.28	24.28
to stay <b>in</b> the EU and <b>try</b> to reduce the	471	45.38	69.65
to leave things <b>as</b> they are,	205	19.75	89.40
to stay <b>in</b> the EU and <b>try</b> to increase t	80	7.71	97.11
to work <b>for</b> the formation <b>of</b> a single E	30	2.89	100.00
Total	1,038	100.00	

-> **tab** CPolEU

What is Conservative EU policy?: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
leaving the European Union,	121	12.96	12.96
staying <b>in</b> the EU and trying to reduce	604	64.67	77.62
leaving things <b>as</b> they are,	147	15.74	93.36
staying <b>in</b> the EU and trying to increas	54	5.78	99.14
working <b>for</b> the formation <b>of</b> a single E	8	0.86	100.00
Total	934	100.00	

-> **tab** LPolEU

What is Labour EU policy?: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
leaving the European Union,	102	12.06	12.06
staying <b>in</b> the EU and trying to reduce	274	32.39	44.44
leaving things <b>as</b> they are,	351	41.49	85.93

What is Labour EU policy?: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
staying <b>in</b> the EU and trying to increas	96	11.35	97.28
<b>or</b> , working <b>for</b> the formation <b>of</b> a sing	23	2.72	100.00
Total	846	100.00	

-> **tab** UKIPPoE

What is UKIP EU policy?: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
leaving the European Union,	839	88.32	88.32
staying <b>in</b> the EU and trying to reduce	36	3.79	92.11
leaving things <b>as</b> they are,	44	4.63	96.74
staying <b>in</b> the EU and trying to increas	14	1.47	98.21
working <b>for</b> the formation <b>of</b> a single E	17	1.79	100.00
Total	950	100.00	

-> **tab** SNPPoE

What is SNP EU policy?: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
leaving the European Union,	6	8.22	8.22
staying <b>in</b> the EU and trying to reduce	20	27.40	35.62
leaving things <b>as</b> they are,	35	47.95	83.56
staying <b>in</b> the EU and trying to increas	10	13.70	97.26
working <b>for</b> the formation <b>of</b> a single E	2	2.74	100.00
Total	73	100.00	

However, many were not certain about what would happen if the EU left (“quite unsure” and “very unsure” were selected by a combined total of about 70%). Therefore, 45.4% of respondents chose “to stay in the EU and reduce the EUs power” as a possible policy toward the EU. 64.7% of respondents understood that the Conservative Party’s policy was “to stay and reduce the EUs power. It is not clear to what extent Cameron was aware of this public opinion, but perhaps it was not so incomprehensible that he adopted the strategy of remaining after implementing the referendum in this context.

2.1 Closer ties with EU and UK economy

We cross out the relationship between party identification and items that



ask about expectations about the impact of closer ties with the EU on the UK economy on a three-point scale of positive, negative, and no difference. Here, Labour Party identifiers have significantly higher positive expectations and fewer negative expectations regarding the relationship with Europe, although one must reserve the right to reserve a small sample of UKIP supporters for the opposite of the Labour Party. For the other parties, however, in this period of heightened Euroskepticism at the MPs level, the cell in the row of Conservative supporters is not significant on the residuals, although their economic expectations for Europe are weaker as a trend. Conversely, there are no statistically significant cells in the rows for Liberal Democrats supporters, who are more or less active in favor of European integration at the political level. Conservative Party supporters were not particularly dissatisfied with the economic situation compared to supporters of other parties. This is evident in the average value of this item for each political party (Fig. 2-1). The data show that there was a gap between politicians and their supporters in all parties.

Respondent's political party identification	Closer EU links make GB strong economically: Version A		
	... stronger economic	weaker economically,	or, would it make no
	observed frequency	expected frequency	adjusted residual
0	40 47.017 -1.388	21 23.575 -0.632	65 55.408 1.849
Con	119 131.349 -1.717	75 65.860 1.576	158 154.791 0.435
Lab	136 107.467 4.168	41 53.886 -2.334	111 126.647 -2.227
LD	12 15.672 -1.199	11 7.858 1.272	19 18.469 0.169

Respondent's political party identification	Closer EU links make GB stong economically: Version A		
	... stronger economic	weaker economically,	or, would it make no
SNP	14	3	11
	10.448	5.239	12.313
	1.409	-1.101	-0.507
PC	1	0	0
	0.373	0.187	0.440
	1.297	-0.480	-0.886
Green	21	5	17
	16.045	8.045	18.909
	1.599	-1.219	-0.600
UKIP	10	21	35
	24.628	12.349	29.023
	-3.860	2.831	1.537

3 cells with expected frequency < 5  
3 cells with expected frequency < 1

Pearson chi2(14) = 43.0460      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-ratio chi2(14) = 44.5241      Pr=0.000




Fig. 2-1

If GB left EU: better or worse economically ?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot better off	87	8.35	8.35
A little better off	184	17.66	26.01
Wouldn t make much difference	355	34.07	60.08
A little worse off	313	30.04	90.12
A lot worse off	103	9.88	100.00
Total	1,042	100.00	

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R's political party identification	If GB left EU: better or worse economically?: Version A				
	A lot better	A little better	Not much diff	A little worse	A lot worse
0	14 11.190 0.945	24 24.452 -0.109	59 44.344 2.898	31 40.338 -1.894	6 13.676 -2.360
Con	24 29.895 -1.418	85 65.326 3.389	99 118.472 -2.753	117 107.769 1.339	33 36.538 -0.778
Lab	19 24.384 -1.362	40 53.282 -2.407	109 96.631 1.840	92 87.901 0.625	32 29.802 0.508
LD	3 3.591 -0.333	6 7.846 -0.746	13 14.230 -0.408	12 12.944 -0.321	9 4.389 2.376
SNP	0 2.839 -1.792	2 6.204 -1.900	10 11.252 -0.464	14 10.235 1.433	8 3.470 2.612
PC	0 0.084 -0.302	0 0.182 -0.473	0 0.331 -0.704	0 0.301 -0.657	1 0.102 2.968
Green	3 3.674 -0.376	3 8.029 -2.009	11 14.561 -1.168	17 13.245 1.263	10 4.491 2.808
UKIP	18 5.344 5.917	17 11.678 1.782	20 21.179 -0.324	9 19.266 -2.895	0 6.532 -2.791

11 cells with expected **frequency** < 5

5 cells with expected **frequency** < 1

Pearson chi2(28) = 113.7913      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-ratio chi2(28) = 106.7795      Pr=0.000

Another item for 2015 asks what would happen to the UK economy if the UK left the EU. A cross-tabulation with party support is also presented. It is similar to the above, but seems to be more direct. At this point, “A lot better off” and “A little better off” together accounted for 26.1% of the respondents who thought that leaving the EU would improve the economy, while “A little worse off” and “A lot worse off” accounted for 39.92%. More respondents expected the economy to be negatively impacted by the withdrawal. Considering the reality of the situation, we can assume that other factors were more important to the respondents.

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If GB left EU: better <b>or</b> worse economically?: Version A		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot better <b>off</b>		87	8.35	8.35
A little better <b>off</b>		184	17.66	26.01
Wouldn t make much difference		355	34.07	60.08
A little worse <b>off</b>		313	30.04	90.12
A lot worse <b>off</b>		103	9.88	100.00
Total		1,042	100.00	

Respondent's political party identification	If GB left EU: better <b>or</b> worse economically?: Version A				
	A lot better	A little better	Not much diff	A little worse	A lot worse
0	14	24	59	31	6
	11.190	24.452	44.344	40.338	13.676
	0.945	-0.109	2.898	-1.894	-2.360
Con	24	85	99	117	33
	29.895	65.326	118.472	107.769	36.538
	-1.418	3.389	-2.753	1.339	-0.778
Lab	19	40	109	92	32
	24.384	53.282	96.631	87.901	29.802
	-1.362	-2.407	1.840	0.625	0.508
LD	3	6	13	12	9
	3.591	7.846	14.230	12.944	4.389
	-0.333	-0.746	-0.408	-0.321	2.376
SNP	0	2	10	14	8
	2.839	6.204	11.252	10.235	3.470
	-1.792	-1.900	-0.464	1.433	2.612
PC	0	0	0	0	1
	0.084	0.182	0.331	0.301	0.102
	-0.302	-0.473	-0.704	-0.657	2.968
Green	3	3	11	17	10
	3.674	8.029	14.561	13.245	4.491
	-0.376	-2.009	-1.168	1.263	2.808
UKIP	18	17	20	9	0
	5.344	11.678	21.179	19.266	6.532
	5.917	1.782	-0.324	-2.895	-2.791

11 cells with expected **frequency** < 5  
5 cells with expected **frequency** < 1

Pearson chi2(28) = 113.7913      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-ratio chi2(28) = 106.7795      Pr=0.000

As a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU will Britain's economy <b>be</b> better <b>off</b> , worse <b>off</b> ,	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot better <b>off</b>	70	7.11	7.11
A little better <b>off</b>	210	21.34	28.46
Won't make much difference	261	26.52	54.98
A little worse <b>off</b>	286	29.07	84.04
A lot worse <b>off</b>	157	15.96	100.00
Total	984	100.00	

observed **frequency**  
expected **frequency**  
adjusted residual

Rs political party identification (party support/ closest to/likely vote at next e	As a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU will Britain's economy <b>be</b> better <b>off</b> , worse <b>off</b> ,				
	A lot better	A little better	Not much diff	A little worse	A lot worse
0	7 7.143 -0.059	27 21.320 1.468	26 26.407 -0.098	30 29.762 0.055	10 15.368 -1.576
Con	41 21.643 5.267	91 64.601 4.517	79 80.013 -0.161	75 90.179 -2.326	17 46.565 -5.745
Lab	12 28.786 -4.324	60 85.921 -4.198	112 106.420 0.840	132 119.940 1.750	87 61.933 4.611
LD	0 4.500 -2.281	6 13.432 -2.368	12 16.636 -1.373	30 18.750 3.211	15 9.682 1.925
SNP	0 1.357 -1.222	1 4.051 -1.727	5 5.017 -0.009	6 5.655 0.175	7 2.920 2.623
PC	0 0.286 -0.556	2 0.853 1.404	2 1.056 1.073	0 1.190 -1.305	0 0.615 -0.854
Green	2 1.143 0.839	4 3.411 0.363	3 4.225 -0.701	1 4.762 -2.075	6 2.459 2.476
UKIP	4 1.143 2.798	6 3.411 1.594	5 4.225 0.443	1 4.762 -2.075	0 2.459 -1.719

19 cells with expected **frequency** < 5

3 cells with expected **frequency** < 1

Pearson chi2(28) = 139.3796      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-ratio chi2(28) = 150.4723      Pr=0.000

The BSA 2017 cross-tabulation of expectations for the UK economy after leaving the EU and party support shows an increase in the percentage of Conservative and UKIP supporters who say they are “A lot better off” compared to 2015, indicating that expectations are rising.

As a result of leaving the EU will Britain's economy be better off, worse off, o	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot better off	60	6.59	6.59
A little better off	199	21.84	28.43
Won't make much difference	240	26.34	54.77
A little worse off	251	27.55	82.33
A lot worse off	161	17.67	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

observed frequency  
expected frequency  
adjusted residual

Rs political party identification (party support/ closest to/likely vote at next e	As a result of leaving the EU will Britain's economy be better off, worse off, o				
	A lot better	A little better	Not much diff	A little worse	A lot worse
0	5	29	52	30	17
	8.908	29.069	35.165	35.790	24.068
	-1.476	-0.016	3.604	-1.232	-1.733
Con	29	92	70	63	20
	18.353	59.887	72.444	73.732	49.584
	3.125	5.701	-0.407	-1.775	-5.638
Lab	15	50	83	103	78
	22.036	71.908	86.986	88.532	59.537
	-1.981	-3.732	-0.636	2.296	3.376
LD	1	6	8	17	21
	3.550	11.584	14.013	14.262	9.591
	-1.447	-1.917	-1.934	0.876	4.204
SNP	2	1	3	9	9
	1.608	5.246	6.345	6.458	4.343
	0.325	-2.127	-1.571	1.187	2.505
PC	0	0	1	0	0
	0.067	0.219	0.264	0.269	0.181
	-0.268	-0.529	1.669	-0.607	-0.470
Green	0	3	3	7	9
	1.474	4.808	5.817	5.920	3.981
	-1.273	-0.945	-1.380	0.526	2.816

Rs political party identification (party support/ closest to/likely vote at next e	As a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU will Britain's economy <b>be</b> better <b>off</b> , worse <b>off</b> , o				
	A lot better	A little better	Not much diff	A little worse	A lot worse
UKIP	5 1.005 4.163	5 3.278 1.085	5 3.966 0.611	0 4.036 -2.371	0 2.714 -1.837

16 cells with expected **frequency** < 5

5 cells with expected **frequency** < 1

Pearson chi2(28) = 141.7999      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-**ratio** chi2(28) = 141.7195      Pr=0.000

In the BSA 2018, “A lot” is slightly less common among Conservative Party supporters and “A little better off” is more common. The total percentage of “A lot” and “A little better off” for all respondents remains largely unchanged: in 2017, there was a significant retreat of UKIP in the general and local elections, as well as the departure of its leadership and internal disputes, which do not appear in the data in the form of support for UKIP (later, prior to the 2019 European Parliament elections, the Brexit Party will take over much of the leadership (Narihiro 2020?)). Brexit Party will take over much of it (Narihiro 2020?)); we assume that in BSA2018 UKIP support will have been absorbed by the Conservative Party to some extent.

As a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU will Britain's economy <b>be</b> better <b>off</b> , worse <b>off</b> , o	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot better <b>off</b>	104	9.99	9.99
A little better <b>off</b>	169	16.23	26.22
Won't make much difference	263	25.26	51.49
A little worse <b>off</b>	276	26.51	78.00
A lot worse <b>off</b>	229	22.00	100.00
Total	1,041	100.00	

observed **frequency**  
expected **frequency**  
adjusted residual

Rs political party identification (party support/ closest to/likely vote at next	As a result of leaving the EU will Britain's economy be better off, worse off, o				
	A lot better	A little better	Not much diff	A little worse	A lot worse
None	12	24	57	28	26
	15.344	23.324	36.366	38.515	33.451
	-0.981	0.166	4.287	-2.144	-1.593
Con	52	82	83	71	33
	33.507	50.931	79.412	84.103	73.046
	4.140	5.821	0.569	-2.040	-6.538
Lab	9	27	66	85	91
	29.019	44.109	68.775	72.837	63.261
	-4.661	-3.333	-0.458	1.969	4.710
LD	4	4	12	42	41
	10.752	16.342	25.481	26.986	23.438
	-2.303	-3.523	-3.259	3.561	4.369
SNP	0	1	4	11	10
	2.714	4.125	6.432	6.812	5.916
	-1.765	-1.701	-1.121	1.894	1.937
Green	0	2	5	12	17
	3.758	5.712	8.906	9.432	8.192
	-2.088	-1.726	-1.538	0.992	3.569
UKIP	7	2	3	0	0
	1.253	1.904	2.969	3.144	2.731
	5.461	0.076	0.021	-2.077	-1.892
Brexit	16	10	7	2	0
	3.653	5.553	8.659	9.170	7.965
	6.954	2.096	-0.662	-2.808	-3.271

9 cells with expected frequency < 5

Pearson chi2(28) = 268.1303      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-ratio chi2(28) = 264.9211      Pr=0.000

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In BSA2019, Conservative Party supporters are rather more bullish, and supporters of Brexit Party, the splinter party of UKIP that made great progress in the 2019 European Parliament elections (not sure how much sense it makes), though still small in the sample, are added to the group that, like UKIP before them, is positive about the economic effects of leaving the EU. This is the last available data on this item looking at expectations for the economic effects of Brexit (BSA2020 is for the Covid-19 Pandemic, so the data collection situation is very different).



## 2.2 Concerns about closer ties with EU undermine UK identity

Next, items that asked for agreement or disagreement with the opinion that closer ties with the EU weaken British identity on a 5-point scale are crossed with party identification in the same way to check residuals (adjusted standardized residuals). The results show significantly more strongly agree/agree cells and significantly fewer neither agree nor strongly disagree cells in the Conservative Party identifiers row. And UKIP identifiers have particularly high proportions of strongly agree and fewer cells below neither and strongly disagree. The pattern is reversed in the Labor Party row. Liberal Democrat identifiers are significantly fewer “strongly agree”. SNP identifiers have significantly more “disagree” and “strongly disagree”. The division between Conservative/UKIP leavers and Labour remainer is clear. Cultural concerns seem to have a clearer divergence of views among party identifiers than the economic impact seen above.

Then the means of the 5-point scale are calculated for each party identifiers and multiple comparisons are made using Scheffe's method. This method does not yield many significant differences; the only significant differences at the 95% significance level are between Conservative vs. Labour, Scottish vs. Conservatives, Greens vs. Conservatives, UKIP vs. Conservative, UKIP vs. Labour, UKIP vs. Liberal Democrats, UKIP vs. Scottish, and UKIP vs. Greens.

In general, it seems that the cultural concerns are more clearly different among party identifiers than the economic impacts seen above. Moreover, given the outcome of the referendum and the 2019 general election that is to follow, it may also be necessary to consider the internal differences in the Conservative and Labour party identifiers, respectively.

observed **frequency**  
 expected **frequency**  
 adjusted residual

Respondent's political party identification	Is EU membership undermining GB identity?: Version A				
	Agr str	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Dsagr str
0	20	48	41	24	5
	25.367	46.046	26.745	31.295	8.547
	-1.270	0.380	3.306	-1.597	-1.349
Con	87	144	51	74	11
	67.461	122.456	71.127	83.226	22.731
	3.309	2.997	-3.340	-1.445	-3.192
Lab	36	85	74	84	28
	56.432	102.436	59.499	69.619	19.015
	-3.616	-2.535	2.515	2.354	2.555
LD	3	12	12	12	4
	7.904	14.348	8.334	9.751	2.663
	-1.974	-0.776	1.446	0.837	0.864
SNP	2	9	4	13	6
	6.250	11.345	6.589	7.710	2.106
	-1.914	-0.868	-1.143	2.204	2.819
PC	0	0	1	0	0
	0.184	0.334	0.194	0.227	0.062
	-0.475	-0.708	2.041	-0.542	-0.257
Green	4	8	7	18	8
	8.272	15.015	8.721	10.205	2.787
	-1.682	-2.269	-0.664	2.840	3.299
UKIP	32	28	4	2	0
	12.132	22.022	12.791	14.967	4.088
	6.533	1.615	-2.833	-3.944	-2.160

9 cells with expected frequency < 5  
5 cells with expected frequency < 1

Pearson chi2(28) = 157.9889      Pr=0.000  
likelihood-ratio chi2(28) = 156.5765      Pr=0.000

Summary for variables: EUBrId  
Group variable: PartyIDN (Respondent's political party identification)

PartyIDN	Mean	SD
0	2.61	1.05
Con	2.40	1.14
Lab	2.94	1.18
LD	3.05	1.11
SNP	3.35	1.23
PC	3.00	.
Green	3.40	1.23
UKIP	1.64	0.74

PartyIDN	Mean	SD
Total	2.65	1.19

Pairwise comparisons of means with equal variances

Over: PartyIDN

	Number of comparisons
PartyIDN	28

EUBrId	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	-0.21	0.11	-1.90	0.82
Lab vs 0	0.34	0.12	2.92	0.29
LD vs 0	0.44	0.20	2.23	0.66
SNP vs 0	0.74	0.22	3.46	0.10
PC vs 0	0.39	1.13	0.35	1.00
Green vs 0	0.79	0.19	4.10	0.02
UKIP vs 0	-0.97	0.17	-5.78	0.00
Lab vs Con	0.55	0.09	6.32	0.00
LD vs Con	0.65	0.18	3.60	0.08
SNP vs Con	0.96	0.20	4.75	0.00
PC vs Con	0.60	1.13	0.54	1.00
Green vs Con	1.00	0.18	5.66	0.00
UKIP vs Con	-0.76	0.15	-5.05	0.00
LD vs Lab	0.10	0.18	0.56	1.00
SNP vs Lab	0.41	0.20	2.01	0.77
PC vs Lab	0.06	1.13	0.05	1.00
Green vs Lab	0.46	0.18	2.54	0.49
UKIP vs Lab	-1.31	0.15	-8.58	0.00
SNP vs LD	0.31	0.26	1.19	0.99
PC vs LD	-0.05	1.14	-0.04	1.00
Green vs LD	0.35	0.24	1.47	0.95
UKIP vs LD	-1.41	0.22	-6.40	0.00
PC vs SNP	-0.35	1.14	-0.31	1.00
Green vs SNP	0.05	0.26	0.18	1.00
UKIP vs SNP	-1.72	0.24	-7.23	0.00
Green vs PC	0.40	1.14	0.35	1.00

EUBrId	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
UKIP vs PC	-1.36	1.13	-1.20	0.98
UKIP vs Green	-1.76	0.22	-8.12	0.00

Next, multiple comparisons (Scheffé) were conducted by looking at the means for each party identification on a 9-point scale from “1 month” to “should not” for the question “How long should immigrants work before receiving child benefits?” No significant differences were found between supporters of the two major parties on this question in 2015 BSA data. In the end, we found only statistically significant differences between Greens vs. Conservatives, UKIP vs. Liberal Democrats, UKIP vs. SNP, and UKIP vs. Greens.

How much <b>do</b> you agree <b>or</b> disagree that being a member <b>of</b> the European Union unde		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
	Agr str	199	19.72	19.72
	Agree	246	24.38	44.10
	Neither	204	20.22	64.32
	Disagree	222	22.00	86.32
	Dsagr str	138	13.68	100.00
Total		1,009	100.00	
Being a member <b>of</b> the EU undermine		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
	Agr str	163	17.49	17.49
	Agree	195	20.92	38.41
	Neither	200	21.46	59.87
	Disagree	245	26.29	86.16
	Disagr str	129	13.84	100.00
Total		932	100.00	

file /Users/tigerhorse/Downloads/bsa/connected\_EUBrId.png saved as PNG format




Fig. 2-2-1

### European identity, originally weak but not weakened now after Brexit

To what extent you think <b>of</b> yourself <b>as</b> European? Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1 Not at <b>all</b> European	304	27.71	27.71
2	178	16.23	43.94
3	154	14.04	57.98
4	200	18.23	76.21
5	124	11.30	87.51
6	74	6.75	94.26
7 Very strongly European	63	5.74	100.00
Total	1,097	100.00	

To what extent you think <b>of</b> yourself <b>as</b> European?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1 Not at <b>all</b> European	300	29.56	29.56
2	118	11.63	41.18
3	127	12.51	53.69
4	161	15.86	69.56
5	123	12.12	81.67
6	88	8.67	90.34
7 Very strongly European	98	9.66	100.00
Total	1,015	100.00	

To what extent you think <b>of</b> yourself <b>as</b> European?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1 Not at <b>all</b> European	308	28.52	28.52
2	99	9.17	37.69

To what extent you think of yourself as European?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
3	134	12.41	50.09
4	196	18.15	68.24
5	138	12.78	81.02
6	93	8.61	89.63
7 Very strongly European	112	10.37	100.00
Total	1,080	100.00	

It is not worth mentioning now that the British are not particularly “European” among the EU member states, with BSA 2015 data showing that only 5.7% of respondant stated themselves as “Very Strongly European.” However, following 57.98% in 2015, the total percentage of “non-European” responses from 1 to 3 has fallen below 50% after the referendum. Conversely, the percentage of respondents who define themselves as “very strongly” European has increased from 5.74% in 2015 to 10.37%.




Fig.2-2-2

## 2.3 Problems caused by the presence of immigrants ?

In favour/opposed: ending right for EU migrants to live and work in Britain: Ver	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly in favour	253	28.21	28.21
Somewhat in favour	251	27.98	56.19
Neither in favour nor opposed	158	17.61	73.80
Somewhat opposed	134	14.94	88.74
Strongly opposed	101	11.26	100.00
Total	897	100.00	

-&gt; tab euendnhs

In favour/opposed: stop EU migrants getting free NHS treatment: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly in favour	317	35.46	35.46
Somewhat in favour	260	29.08	64.54
Neither in favour nor opposed	108	12.08	76.62
Somewhat opposed	109	12.19	88.81
Strongly opposed	100	11.19	100.00
Total	894	100.00	

-&gt; tab euredben

In favour/opposed: reduce ability of EU migrants claiming welfare benefits in Br	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly in favour	408	45.43	45.43
Somewhat in favour	261	29.06	74.50
Neither in favour nor opposed	77	8.57	83.07
Somewhat opposed	74	8.24	91.31
Strongly opposed	78	8.69	100.00
Total	898	100.00	

-&gt; tab euendwtd

In favour/opposed: stop EU deciding maximum working hours in Britain: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly in favour	288	32.73	32.73
Somewhat in favour	241	27.39	60.11
Neither in favour nor opposed	188	21.36	81.48
Somewhat opposed	79	8.98	90.45
Strongly opposed	84	9.55	100.00

In favour/opposed: stop EU deciding maximum working hours in Britain: Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Total	880	100.00	

-> **tab euredreg**

In favour/opposed: reduce EU regulation of companies/businesses in Britain: Vers	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly in favour	342	38.95	38.95
Somewhat in favour	247	28.13	67.08
Neither in favour nor opposed	155	17.65	84.74
Somewhat opposed	73	8.31	93.05
Strongly opposed	61	6.95	100.00
Total	878	100.00	

56.2% of respondents were in favor (“Strong in favor” and “Somewhat in favor”) of “stop granting residence and work rights to EU migrants,” 64.5% were in favor of “stop EU migrants from getting free treatment in the NHS,” and 74% were in favor of “to reduce the ability of EU immigrants to claim welfare benefits”. The strong connection between so-called “welfare chauvinism” and the EU is evident.

Pairwise comparisons of means with equal variances

Over: PartyIDN

	Number of comparisons
PartyIDN	28

MiCultur	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs None	-1.56	0.56	-2.81	0.34
Lab vs None	-0.56	0.57	-0.98	1.00
LD vs None	-0.32	0.71	-0.45	1.00
SNP vs None	-0.34	1.30	-0.26	1.00
Green vs None	0.63	1.08	0.58	1.00
UKIP vs None	-4.30	1.52	-2.82	0.34
Brexit vs None	-4.11	1.13	-3.64	0.07



MiCultur	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
Lab vs Con	1.00	0.48	2.09	0.74
LD vs Con	1.24	0.64	1.94	0.81
SNP vs Con	1.23	1.26	0.97	1.00
Green vs Con	2.19	1.04	2.12	0.72
UKIP vs Con	-2.74	1.49	-1.84	0.85
Brexit vs Con	-2.54	1.08	-2.35	0.60
LD vs Lab	0.24	0.66	0.37	1.00
SNP vs Lab	0.22	1.27	0.18	1.00
Green vs Lab	1.19	1.04	1.14	0.99
UKIP vs Lab	-3.74	1.50	-2.50	0.51
Brexit vs Lab	-3.55	1.09	-3.25	0.16
SNP vs LD	-0.02	1.34	-0.01	1.00
Green vs LD	0.95	1.13	0.84	1.00
UKIP vs LD	-3.98	1.56	-2.56	0.48
Brexit vs LD	-3.79	1.17	-3.23	0.17
Green vs SNP	0.97	1.57	0.62	1.00
UKIP vs SNP	-3.96	1.90	-2.09	0.74
Brexit vs SNP	-3.77	1.60	-2.35	0.59
UKIP vs Green	-4.93	1.76	-2.81	0.34
Brexit vs Green	-4.74	1.43	-3.32	0.14
Brexit vs UKIP	0.19	1.78	0.11	1.00

Summary **for** variables: MiCultur

Group **variable**: PartyIDN (Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote

PartyIDN	Mean
None	7.676056
Con	6.11215
Lab	7.115196
LD	7.356495
SNP	7.338235
Green	8.304762
UKIP	3.375
Brexit	3.568421
Total	6.778652

Multiple comparisons (Scheffe) of means per party identification were made for items that asked about the impact of immigration on British culture in general terms on an 11-point scale. Conspicuously, since we cannot say that there is a difference between the two major party supporters, and UKIP supporters have a more hard-line position on immigration than Conservative supporters, the only statistically significant differences are Liberal Democrats vs. Conservatives, Greens vs. Conservatives, UKIP vs. Conservatives, Greens vs. Labor, UKIP vs. UKIPvs Liberal Democrats, UKIPvs SNP, and UKIPvs Greens. The average for all respondents was 4.7, suggesting that, even on average, some degree of concern about cultural erosion due to increased immigration was felt by the British public.

Pairwise comparisons of means with equal variances

	Number of comparisons			
PartyIDN	28			
PrNHSBr	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	-0.18	0.10	-1.73	0.89
Lab vs 0	-0.47	0.11	-4.36	0.01
LD vs 0	-0.46	0.19	-2.41	0.56
SNP vs 0	-0.57	0.21	-2.71	0.40
PC vs 0	-0.07	0.55	-0.12	1.00
Green vs 0	-1.09	0.18	-5.90	0.00
UKIP vs 0	0.48	0.17	2.84	0.33
Lab vs Con	-0.29	0.08	-3.51	0.09
LD vs Con	-0.28	0.18	-1.57	0.93
SNP vs Con	-0.39	0.20	-1.96	0.80
PC vs Con	0.11	0.54	0.21	1.00
Green vs Con	-0.91	0.17	-5.31	0.00
UKIP vs Con	0.66	0.15	4.30	0.01
LD vs Lab	0.01	0.18	0.06	1.00
SNP vs Lab	-0.10	0.20	-0.49	1.00

PrNHSBr	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PC vs Lab	0.40	0.54	0.74	1.00
Green vs Lab	-0.62	0.17	-3.58	0.08
UKIP vs Lab	0.95	0.16	6.09	0.00
SNP vs LD	-0.11	0.25	-0.43	1.00
PC vs LD	0.39	0.56	0.69	1.00
Green vs LD	-0.63	0.23	-2.71	0.40
UKIP vs LD	0.93	0.22	4.24	0.01
PC vs SNP	0.50	0.57	0.88	1.00
Green vs SNP	-0.52	0.25	-2.09	0.74
UKIP vs SNP	1.04	0.24	4.39	0.01
Green vs PC	-1.02	0.56	-1.82	0.85
UKIP vs PC	0.54	0.56	0.98	1.00
UKIP vs Green	1.57	0.22	7.25	0.00

Summary **for** variables: PrNHSBr

Group **variable:** PartyIDN (Respondent's political party identification)

PartyIDN	Mean
0	4.067568
Con	3.887435
Lab	3.598706
LD	3.609756
SNP	3.5
PC	4
Green	2.977273
UKIP	4.54386
Total	3.800393

Multiple comparisons were made by party support of responses to the question of whether immigration is, overall, reducing or increasing the burden on the NHS across the UK. Significant differences are observed for UKIP vs Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Scottish Nationalists, and Conservatives vs Greens, with UKIP supporters' opinions being the most heavily burdened by immigration and the least clearly different from the other parties. There is little difference between the parties other than UKIP.

There is a significant difference between Green supporters, who are optimistic about the issue, and the Conservatives, who are the hardest hit by immigration among the middle-of-the-road parties. In the Leave Campaign during the campaign for the EU In/Out Referendum, the Leader of the UKIP, Nigel Farage, frequently talked about his “vision” of redeveloping the NHS by taking back money “stolen” by the EU, which would have been effective in solidifying support for Leave among UKIP supporters as seen here.

Does migration generally reduce/increase pressure on NHS in your area?: Versions	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Reduces pressure a lot	29	2.76	2.76
Reduces pressure a little	91	8.65	11.41
Neither increases nor reduces pressure	314	29.85	41.25
Increases pressure a little	347	32.98	74.24
Increases pressure a lot	271	25.76	100.00
Total	1,052	100.00	

Summary for variables: PrNHSLA  
Group variable: GOR2 (Government office region 2003 version)

GOR2	Mean
North East	3.727273
North West	3.639706
Yorkshire and Hu	3.895349
East Midlands	3.8
West Midlands	3.764151
SW	3.62963
Eastern	3.324324
Inner London	3.833333
Outer London	3.755952
South East	3.58427
Wales	3.648148
Scotland	3.6
Total	3.703422

Pairwise comparisons of means with equal variances

	Number of comparisons
GOR2	66

PrNHSLA	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
GOR2				
North West vs North East	-0.09	0.18	-0.49	1.00
Yorkshire and Humberside vs North East	0.17	0.19	0.88	1.00
East Midlands vs North East	0.07	0.19	0.39	1.00
West Midlands vs North East	0.04	0.18	0.20	1.00
SW vs North East	-0.10	0.19	-0.51	1.00
Eastern vs North East	-0.40	0.23	-1.75	0.99
Inner London vs North East	0.11	0.20	0.53	1.00
Outer London vs North East	0.03	0.17	0.16	1.00
South East vs North East	-0.14	0.19	-0.75	1.00
Wales vs North East	-0.08	0.21	-0.38	1.00
Scotland vs North East	-0.13	0.19	-0.67	1.00
Yorkshire and Humberside vs North West	0.26	0.14	1.80	0.99
East Midlands vs North West	0.16	0.14	1.18	1.00
West Midlands vs North West	0.12	0.13	0.93	1.00
SW vs North West	-0.01	0.14	-0.07	1.00
Eastern vs North West	-0.32	0.19	-1.65	0.99
Inner London vs North West	0.19	0.15	1.25	1.00
Outer London vs North West	0.12	0.12	0.98	1.00
South East vs North West	-0.06	0.14	-0.39	1.00
Wales vs North West	0.01	0.17	0.05	1.00
Scotland vs North West	-0.04	0.14	-0.28	1.00
East Midlands vs Yorkshire and Humberside	-0.10	0.15	-0.63	1.00
West Midlands vs Yorkshire and Humberside	-0.13	0.15	-0.88	1.00
SW vs Yorkshire and Humberside	-0.27	0.16	-1.67	0.99
Eastern vs Yorkshire and Humberside	-0.57	0.20	-2.82	0.72
Inner London vs Yorkshire and Humberside	-0.06	0.17	-0.37	1.00
Outer London vs Yorkshire and Humberside	-0.14	0.14	-1.02	1.00
South East vs Yorkshire and Humberside	-0.31	0.16	-2.00	0.97
Wales vs Yorkshire and Humberside	-0.25	0.18	-1.38	1.00
Scotland vs Yorkshire and Humberside	-0.30	0.16	-1.88	0.98
West Midlands vs East Midlands	-0.04	0.14	-0.25	1.00
SW vs East Midlands	-0.17	0.15	-1.11	1.00
Eastern vs East Midlands	-0.48	0.20	-2.40	0.89

PrNHSLA	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
Inner London vs East Midlands	0.03	0.16	0.20	1.00
Outer London vs East Midlands	-0.04	0.13	-0.34	1.00
South East vs East Midlands	-0.22	0.15	-1.44	1.00
Wales vs East Midlands	-0.15	0.17	-0.87	1.00
Scotland vs East Midlands	-0.20	0.15	-1.32	1.00
SW vs West Midlands	-0.13	0.15	-0.89	1.00
Eastern vs West Midlands	-0.44	0.20	-2.24	0.93
Inner London vs West Midlands	0.07	0.16	0.43	1.00
Outer London vs West Midlands	-0.01	0.13	-0.06	1.00
South East vs West Midlands	-0.18	0.15	-1.22	1.00
Wales vs West Midlands	-0.12	0.17	-0.67	1.00
Scotland vs West Midlands	-0.16	0.15	-1.09	1.00
Eastern vs SW	-0.31	0.20	-1.49	1.00
Inner London vs SW	0.20	0.17	1.19	1.00
Outer London vs SW	0.13	0.14	0.91	1.00
South East vs SW	-0.05	0.16	-0.29	1.00
Wales vs SW	0.02	0.18	0.10	1.00
Scotland vs SW	-0.03	0.16	-0.19	1.00
Inner London vs Eastern	0.51	0.21	2.41	0.89
Outer London vs Eastern	0.43	0.19	2.31	0.91
South East vs Eastern	0.26	0.20	1.29	1.00
Wales vs Eastern	0.32	0.22	1.47	1.00
Scotland vs Eastern	0.28	0.20	1.36	1.00
Outer London vs Inner London	-0.08	0.15	-0.52	1.00
South East vs Inner London	-0.25	0.17	-1.49	1.00
Wales vs Inner London	-0.19	0.19	-0.98	1.00
Scotland vs Inner London	-0.23	0.17	-1.38	1.00
South East vs Outer London	-0.17	0.14	-1.27	1.00
Wales vs Outer London	-0.11	0.16	-0.67	1.00
Scotland vs Outer London	-0.16	0.14	-1.14	1.00
Wales vs South East	0.06	0.18	0.36	1.00
Scotland vs South East	0.02	0.16	0.10	1.00
Scotland vs Wales	-0.05	0.18	-0.27	1.00

## How many years should an immigrant be employed before receiving child benefits?

Pairwise comparisons **of means** with equal variances  
Over: PartyIDN

	Number <b>of</b> comparisons			
PartyIDN	28			

MigChBen	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	-0.06	0.23	-0.24	1.00
Lab vs 0	-0.45	0.24	-1.92	0.81
LD vs 0	-0.81	0.40	-2.00	0.78
SNP vs 0	-1.43	0.44	-3.23	0.17
PC vs 0	-2.46	2.32	-1.06	0.99
Green vs 0	-1.48	0.40	-3.74	0.05
UKIP vs 0	0.93	0.35	2.70	0.40
Lab vs Con	-0.40	0.18	-2.23	0.67
LD vs Con	-0.75	0.37	-2.02	0.77
SNP vs Con	-1.37	0.41	-3.32	0.14
PC vs Con	-2.40	2.32	-1.04	0.99
Green vs Con	-1.43	0.37	-3.90	0.03
UKIP vs Con	0.99	0.31	3.20	0.18
LD vs Lab	-0.36	0.38	-0.94	1.00
SNP vs Lab	-0.98	0.42	-2.34	0.60
PC vs Lab	-2.01	2.32	-0.87	1.00
Green vs Lab	-1.03	0.37	-2.79	0.35
UKIP vs Lab	1.39	0.31	4.42	0.01
SNP vs LD	-0.62	0.53	-1.17	0.99
PC vs LD	-1.65	2.34	-0.71	1.00
Green vs LD	-0.67	0.49	-1.37	0.97
UKIP vs LD	1.74	0.45	3.84	0.04
PC vs SNP	-1.03	2.35	-0.44	1.00
Green vs SNP	-0.05	0.53	-0.10	1.00
UKIP vs SNP	2.36	0.49	4.84	0.00
Green vs PC	0.98	2.34	0.42	1.00

MigChBen	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
UKIP vs PC	3.39	2.33	1.46	0.95
UKIP vs Green	2.42	0.45	5.40	0.00

How <b>long</b> should migrants from within EU have lived <b>in</b> Britain before they can re	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Less than a <b>year</b>	210	7.46	7.46
A <b>year</b>	436	15.49	22.95
Two years	495	17.58	40.53
Three years	363	12.90	53.43
Four years	358	12.72	66.15
More than four years	634	22.52	88.67
Should never <b>be</b> able to access	319	11.33	100.00
Total	2,815	100.00	

How <b>long</b> should migrants from within EU have lived <b>in</b> Britain before they can re	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Less than a <b>year</b>	315	10.45	10.45
A <b>year</b>	470	15.60	26.05
Two years	484	16.06	42.12
Three years	451	14.97	57.09
Four years	332	11.02	68.10
More than four years	674	22.37	90.47
Should never <b>be</b> able to access	287	9.53	100.00
Total	3,013	100.00	

How <b>long</b> should migrants from outside the EU have lived <b>in</b> Britain before they c	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Less than a <b>year</b>	228	7.60	7.60
A <b>year</b>	384	12.80	20.41
Two years	435	14.50	34.91
Three years	399	13.30	48.22
Four years	340	11.34	59.55
More than four years	742	24.74	84.29
Should never <b>be</b> able to access	471	15.71	100.00
Total	2,999	100.00	

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BSA2016 has a section on ‘How long should migrants from within the EU



have lived in Britain before they can receive the same welfare benefits?’ This is similar to the question on child benefits in BSA2015 above. A similar question is in BSA2019, which also adds a question on immigration from outside the EU. It appears that immigrants from the EU are viewed somewhat more leniently than immigrants from outside the EU, although only slightly, with little difference in rating between the 2016 BSA and the 2016 BSA.

Multiple comparisons were conducted on the item asking about pressure on the NHS due to immigratio in the area where the respondent lives n to ascertain the existence of regional differences, but there are no significant differences in the way it is felt across regions. It may not be the case that realistic immigration pressures are felt according to specific regional circumstances.

3. After Referendum: BSA2016, BSA2017 and BSA2018

3.1 Referendum Votes

The vast majority of Fieldwork for collecting British Social Attitudes Survey 2016 data was conducted between July and October 2016, with a very small number of interviews taking place in November.

The referendum on whether to leave the European Union, based on the 2015 European Union Referendum Act passed in the previous year, was held on June 23, 2016, so the BSA survey for this year was time-shifted to the very near term.

What <b>do</b> you think Britains <b>long</b> -term EU policy should <b>be</b> : Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
to leave the European Union,	252	24.28	24.28
to stay <b>in</b> the EU and <b>try</b> to reduce the	471	45.38	69.65
to leave things <b>as</b> they are,	205	19.75	89.40
to stay <b>in</b> the EU and <b>try</b> to increase t	80	7.71	97.11

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What <b>do</b> you think Britains <b>long</b> -term EU policy should <b>be</b> : Version A	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
to work <b>for</b> the formation <b>of</b> a single E	30	2.89	100.00
Total	1,038	100.00	

What <b>do</b> you think Britains <b>long</b> -term EU policy should <b>be</b> ?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
leave the European Union,	853	45.23	45.23
stay <b>in</b> the EU and <b>try</b> to reduce the EU	666	35.31	80.54
stay <b>in</b> the EU and <b>try</b> to <b>keep</b> the EU <b>p</b>	264	14.00	94.54
stay <b>in</b> the EU and <b>try</b> to increase the	64	3.39	97.93
work <b>for</b> the formation <b>of</b> a single Euro	39	2.07	100.00
Total	1,886	100.00	

Pairwise comparisons **of means** with equal variances

Over: PartyIDN

	Number <b>of</b> comparisons
PartyIDN	21

ECPolicy2	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	-0.24	0.07	-3.44	0.07
Lab vs 0	0.17	0.07	2.40	0.45
LD vs 0	0.31	0.11	2.89	0.21
SNP vs 0	0.29	0.12	2.41	0.45
Green vs 0	0.57	0.15	3.81	0.02
UKIP vs 0	-0.71	0.11	-6.32	0.00
Lab vs Con	0.41	0.05	7.93	0.00
LD vs Con	0.55	0.09	5.80	0.00
SNP vs Con	0.53	0.11	4.83	0.00
Green vs Con	0.80	0.14	5.74	0.00
UKIP vs Con	-0.47	0.10	-4.65	0.00
LD vs Lab	0.14	0.10	1.44	0.91
SNP vs Lab	0.12	0.11	1.07	0.98
Green vs Lab	0.39	0.14	2.80	0.25
UKIP vs Lab	-0.88	0.10	-8.62	0.00
SNP vs LD	-0.02	0.14	-0.14	1.00
Green vs LD	0.26	0.16	1.60	0.86

ECPolicy2	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
UKIP vs LD	-1.02	0.13	-7.89	0.00
Green vs SNP	0.28	0.17	1.63	0.85
UKIP vs SNP	-1.00	0.14	-7.12	0.00
UKIP vs Green	-1.28	0.17	-7.70	0.00

Summary **for** variables: ECPolicy2

Group **variable**: PartyIDN (Rs political party identification (party support/closest to/likely vote

PartyIDN	Mean
0	1.84375
Con	1.604294
Lab	2.014134
LD	2.150943
SNP	2.131579
Green	2.409091
UKIP	1.133333
Total	1.818544

Summary **for** variables: ECPolicy

Group **variable**: PartyIDN (Respondent's political party identification)

PartyIDN	Mean
0	2.330769
Con	1.977961
Lab	2.428082
LD	2.232558
SNP	2.606061
PC	3
Green	2.613636
UKIP	1.515152
Total	2.191358

Compared to the responses to the same worded question item in BSA 2015, the percentage of respondents who favored “leave” has almost doubled, with a corresponding decrease in the number of responses assuming remain. This is not surprising given the reality of the referendum results. Still, in the 2016 BSA data, numbers seem to indicate that there was just barely room

for REMAIN to win. Since the percentage of remainers who wanted to reduce the EU's power was over 30% of the total and 2/3 of remainers, the story might have been different if Cameron had been able to speak convincingly on this point (and if Cameron had been able to show a sufficient track record in the negotiations to this point).

The 5-point scale was viewed as a numerical value and averages were calculated for each party identification and multiple comparisons were made. Differences are clearer than a year ago. Statistically significant differences were found between Conservative and UKIP supporters and supporters of all parties except their own. For the no party support group the mean has also dropped close to that of the Conservatives, but the only significant difference is between UKIP and the Greens. Generally, as the referendum campaign went on, a clear polarization developed. It may be suggested that referendums (and their campaigns) themselves have the strong effect of dividing public opinion.

In a section that asked respondents about their current concerns which allows multiple answers, "immigration" was cited by 33.0% of respondents. Although there is no way to know the level of importance of this concern among multiple responses, it is a concern similar to "physical health" (34.7%), which was cited by the largest number of respondents. Differences by region of residence and age were also observed. A logistic regression analysis was conducted with mention of immigration issues as the dependent variable and region and age category (dummied) as independent variables. In terms of age, being in the middle-aged group and older increases the probability of mentioning the issue, while in terms of region, there is a decrease in the probability of mentioning the issue residents in London and Scotland.

Mean estimation Number of obs = 2,938

	Mean	Std. err.	[95% conf. interval]	
CrPImm	0.33	0.01	0.31	0.35

Mean estimation Number of obs = 2,938

	Mean	Std. err.	[95% conf. interval]	
c.CrPImm@GOR_ID				
A North East	0.34	0.04	0.27	0.42
B North West	0.34	0.02	0.29	0.38
D Yorkshire and The Humber	0.42	0.03	0.35	0.48
E East Midlands	0.36	0.03	0.30	0.43
F West Midlands	0.37	0.03	0.31	0.43
G East of England	0.41	0.03	0.36	0.47
H London	0.20	0.02	0.15	0.25
J South East	0.32	0.02	0.27	0.36
K South West	0.38	0.03	0.33	0.44
L Wales	0.28	0.04	0.22	0.35
M Scotland	0.19	0.02	0.15	0.24

Pairwise comparisons of means with equal variances

Over: RAgeCat

	Number of comparisons
RAgeCat	28

CrPImm	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
RAgeCat				
25-34 vs 18-24	0.05	0.04	1.22	0.98
35-44 vs 18-24	0.04	0.04	0.99	1.00
45-54 vs 18-24	0.12	0.04	2.89	0.30
55-59 vs 18-24	0.21	0.05	4.49	0.01
60-64 vs 18-24	0.19	0.05	4.02	0.02
65+ vs 18-24	0.19	0.04	4.80	0.00
DK/Refused vs 18-24	0.04	0.17	0.25	1.00
35-44 vs 25-34	-0.01	0.03	-0.33	1.00
45-54 vs 25-34	0.07	0.03	2.22	0.67
55-59 vs 25-34	0.16	0.04	4.22	0.01

CrPImm	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
60-64 vs 25-34	0.13	0.04	3.63	0.07
65+ vs 25-34	0.14	0.03	4.93	0.00
DK/Refused vs 25-34	-0.01	0.17	-0.05	1.00
45-54 vs 35-44	0.08	0.03	2.64	0.43
55-59 vs 35-44	0.17	0.04	4.59	0.00
60-64 vs 35-44	0.15	0.04	3.99	0.03
65+ vs 35-44	0.15	0.03	5.52	0.00
DK/Refused vs 35-44	0.00	0.17	0.01	1.00
55-59 vs 45-54	0.09	0.04	2.47	0.53
60-64 vs 45-54	0.07	0.04	1.85	0.84
65+ vs 45-54	0.07	0.03	2.62	0.44
DK/Refused vs 45-54	-0.08	0.17	-0.46	1.00
60-64 vs 55-59	-0.02	0.04	-0.54	1.00
65+ vs 55-59	-0.02	0.03	-0.63	1.00
DK/Refused vs 55-59	-0.17	0.17	-0.99	1.00
65+ vs 60-64	0.00	0.03	0.05	1.00
DK/Refused vs 60-64	-0.14	0.17	-0.86	1.00
DK/Refused vs 65+	-0.15	0.17	-0.88	1.00

Iteration 0: log likelihood=-1863.5424  
Iteration 1: log likelihood=-1799.1403  
Iteration 2: log likelihood=-1798.2786  
Iteration 3: log likelihood=-1798.2776  
Iteration 4: log likelihood=-1798.2776

Logistic regression  
Number of obs =2,938  
LR chi2(17) =130.53  
Prob > chi2 =0.0000  
Pseudo R2 =0.0350

Log likelihood=-1798.2776

CrPImm	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P >  z	[95% conf. interval]	
RAgeCat						
25-34	0.30	0.22	1.36	0.17	-0.13	0.74
35-44	0.26	0.22	1.19	0.23	-0.17	0.69
45-54	0.65	0.21	3.01	0.00	0.23	1.07
55-59	1.02	0.23	4.36	0.00	0.56	1.47
60-64	0.91	0.23	3.89	0.00	0.45	1.36
65+	0.90	0.20	4.40	0.00	0.50	1.30

	CrPIImm	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P >  z	[95% conf. interval]	
DK/Refused		0.40	0.85	0.47	0.64	-1.27	2.06
GOR_ID							
B North West		-0.01	0.20	-0.06	0.96	-0.40	0.38
D Yorkshire and The Humber		0.34	0.21	1.63	0.10	-0.07	0.75
E East Midlands		0.05	0.22	0.24	0.81	-0.38	0.48
F West Midlands		0.10	0.21	0.48	0.63	-0.32	0.52
G East of England		0.30	0.20	1.49	0.14	-0.10	0.70
H London		-0.65	0.23	-2.88	0.00	-1.09	-0.21
J South East		-0.10	0.20	-0.49	0.62	-0.48	0.29
K South West		0.17	0.20	0.86	0.39	-0.22	0.57
L Wales		-0.31	0.24	-1.30	0.19	-0.78	0.16
M Scotland		-0.76	0.23	-3.30	0.00	-1.21	-0.31
_cons		-1.30	0.25	-5.28	0.00	-1.79	-0.82

Summary for variables: EUBrId  
Group variable: PartyIDN (Respondent's political party identification)

PartyIDN	Mean	SD
0	2.61	1.05
Con	2.40	1.14
Lab	2.94	1.18
LD	3.05	1.11
SNP	3.35	1.23
PC	3.00	.
Green	3.40	1.23
UKIP	1.64	0.74
Total	2.65	1.19

Pairwise comparisons of means with equal variances

Over: PartyIDN

	Number of comparisons
PartyIDN	28

EUBrId	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	-0.21	0.11	-1.90	0.82

EUBrId	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
Lab vs 0	0.34	0.12	2.92	0.29
LD vs 0	0.44	0.20	2.23	0.66
SNP vs 0	0.74	0.22	3.46	0.10
PC vs 0	0.39	1.13	0.35	1.00
Green vs 0	0.79	0.19	4.10	0.02
UKIP vs 0	-0.97	0.17	-5.78	0.00
Lab vs Con	0.55	0.09	6.32	0.00
LD vs Con	0.65	0.18	3.60	0.08
SNP vs Con	0.96	0.20	4.75	0.00
PC vs Con	0.60	1.13	0.54	1.00
Green vs Con	1.00	0.18	5.66	0.00
UKIP vs Con	-0.76	0.15	-5.05	0.00
LD vs Lab	0.10	0.18	0.56	1.00
SNP vs Lab	0.41	0.20	2.01	0.77
PC vs Lab	0.06	1.13	0.05	1.00
Green vs Lab	0.46	0.18	2.54	0.49
UKIP vs Lab	-1.31	0.15	-8.58	0.00
SNP vs LD	0.31	0.26	1.19	0.99
PC vs LD	-0.05	1.14	-0.04	1.00
Green vs LD	0.35	0.24	1.47	0.95
UKIP vs LD	-1.41	0.22	-6.40	0.00
PC vs SNP	-0.35	1.14	-0.31	1.00
Green vs SNP	0.05	0.26	0.18	1.00
UKIP vs SNP	-1.72	0.24	-7.23	0.00
Green vs PC	0.40	1.14	0.35	1.00
UKIP vs PC	-1.36	1.13	-1.20	0.98
UKIP vs Green	-1.76	0.22	-8.12	0.00

### British influence after Brexit

Compared to a similar question in 2015 on whether participation in European integration would undermine the UK's identity, the average value decreased for supporters of the Leave party and reversed for Remain, indicating an increase in partisan polarization.



27.8% of total respondents said that leaving the EU would “increase” or “increase a little” the U.K.’s influence on the world, while 72.2% said it would “not change much,” “decrease a little,” or “decrease a lot. The unemployment rate is also not very optimistic, with 32.1% saying it will “increase,” and 68.8% saying it will “remain the same” or “decrease.”

As a result of leaving the EU will immigration to Britain be higher, lower, or w	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot higher	16	1.59	1.59
A little higher	43	4.28	5.87
Won't make much difference	405	40.30	46.17
A little lower	417	41.49	87.66
A lot lower	124	12.34	100.00
Total	1,005	100.00	

How much do you agree or disagree that being a member of the European Union unde	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Agree strongly	259	25.77	25.77
Agree	317	31.54	57.31
Neither agree nor disagree	184	18.31	75.62
Disagree	184	18.31	93.93
Disagree strongly	61	6.07	100.00
Total	1,005	100.00	

57.3% of respondents “strongly agree” or “agree” that being a member of the EU limits the UK’s sovereignty, and 24.3% disagree. Conversely, more than half of the respondents believe that leaving the EU will restore the UK’s sovereignty. This restoration of sovereignty is expected to help control immigration. As for the impact of withdrawal on control of the U.K. economy, 58% believe that the U.K. will have “more control,” but as noted above, they are not very optimistic about the economic prospects of leaving the U.K. economy. However, this does not mean that the economy will improve just because the UK is in control of its own economy.

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Once Britain has left the EU, <b>do</b> you think immigration into Britain should <b>be in</b>	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Increased a lot	31	1.05	1.05
Increased a little	120	4.07	5.13
Stay at same <b>as</b> now	1,164	39.52	44.65
Reduced a little	886	30.08	74.74
Reduced a lot	744	25.26	100.00
Total	2,945	100.00	

Once Britain has left the EU, <b>do</b> you think immigration into Britain should <b>be in</b>	Did you vote to "remain a member <b>of</b> the EU" or to "leave the EU"?	
	Remain a member <b>of</b> t	Leave the European U
Increased a lot	17	4
	11.008	9.992
	2.631	-2.631
Increased a little	62	19
	42.460	38.540
	4.430	-4.430
Stay at ame <b>as</b> now	654	223
	459.724	417.276
	16.965	-16.965
Reduced a little	313	368
	356.981	324.019
	-4.065	4.065
Reduced a lot	102	428
	277.826	252.174
	-17.565	17.565

Pearson  $\chi^2(4) = 443.5602$  Pr=0.000  
likelihood-ratio  $\chi^2(4) = 468.8987$  Pr=0.000

Pairwise comparisons **of means** with equal variances

Over: PartyIDN

	Number <b>of</b> comparisons
PartyIDN	28

LeavEUI	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
PartyIDN				
Con vs 0	0.05	0.05	1.01	0.99
Lab vs 0	-0.30	0.05	-5.67	0.00
LD vs 0	-0.51	0.08	-6.39	0.00
SNP vs 0	-0.58	0.13	-4.62	0.00
PC vs 0	0.20	0.24	0.83	1.00

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LeavEUI	Scheffe			
	Contrast	Std. err.	t	P >  t
Green vs 0	-0.50	0.12	-4.01	0.02
UKIP vs 0	0.81	0.13	6.21	0.00
Lab vs Con	-0.35	0.04	-8.94	0.00
LD vs Con	-0.56	0.07	-7.87	0.00
SNP vs Con	-0.63	0.12	-5.26	0.00
PC vs Con	0.15	0.24	0.61	1.00
Green vs Con	-0.55	0.12	-4.64	0.00
UKIP vs Con	0.75	0.13	6.01	0.00
LD vs Lab	-0.21	0.07	-2.97	0.27
SNP vs Lab	-0.28	0.12	-2.32	0.61
PC vs Lab	0.50	0.24	2.10	0.73
Green vs Lab	-0.20	0.12	-1.67	0.90
UKIP vs Lab	1.11	0.12	8.88	0.00
SNP vs LD	-0.07	0.13	-0.51	1.00
PC vs LD	0.71	0.25	2.89	0.30
Green vs LD	0.01	0.13	0.09	1.00
UKIP vs LD	1.32	0.14	9.52	0.00
PC vs SNP	0.78	0.26	2.94	0.28
Green vs SNP	0.08	0.16	0.49	1.00
UKIP vs SNP	1.39	0.17	8.22	0.00
Green vs PC	-0.70	0.26	-2.65	0.43
UKIP vs PC	0.61	0.27	2.28	0.64
UKIP vs Green	1.31	0.17	7.78	0.00

Mean estimation

Number of obs = 2,769

	Mean	Std. err.	[95% conf. interval]	
c.LeavEUI@PartyIDN				
0	3.87	0.05	3.77	3.97
Con	3.93	0.03	3.87	3.98
Lab	3.57	0.03	3.52	3.62
LD	3.36	0.06	3.24	3.48
SNP	3.29	0.12	3.05	3.53
PC	4.07	0.25	3.59	4.55
Green	3.37	0.13	3.13	3.62
UKIP	4.68	0.08	4.51	4.84

When asked what should be done with the number of immigrants after leaving the EU, 39.5% of respondants said UK should maintain the status quo and 55.3% said UK should reduce it. When crossed with the choice in the referendum, there is still a strong linkage between whether to remain or leave and the number of immigrants desired. In addition, multiple comparisons were conducted after calculating the mean value of this item. The average for all respondents is already high at 3.74, and the average for supporters of each party is also above 3 for the status quo, even for europhile Liberal Democrats and Greens (3.36 and 3.37). Statistically significant differences were found for Labor vs. Conservative, Liberal Democrats vs. Conservative, SNP vs. Conservative, Green vs. Conservative, UKIP vs. Conservative, UKIP vs. Labor, UKIP vs. Liberal Democrats, UKIP vs. SNP, and UKIP vs. Green. This is a good illustration of what the motivation for leaving was for the majority.

If you were given the chance to vote again, how would you vote – to remain a mem	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Remain a member of EU	1,445	51.19	51.19
Leave the EU	1,148	40.67	91.85
I would not vote	230	8.15	100.00
Total	2,823	100.00	

observed frequency  
expected frequency  
adjusted residual

If you were given the chance to vote again, how would you vote – to remain a mem	Did you vote to “remain a member of the EU” or to “leave the EU”?	
	Remain a member of t	Leave the European U
Remain a member of EU	1,091	88
	626.769	552.231
	40.126	-40.126
Leave the EU	58	909
	514.067	452.933
	-39.496	39.496
I would not vote	3	18
	11.164	9.836
	-3.588	3.588

Pearson chi2(2) = 1.6e + 03      Pr=0.000  
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 1.9e + 03      Pr=0.000

This BSA 2017 data was collected one year after the EU In/Out referendum. On April 18, 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May declared her first general election since taking office. The general election, held on June 8, did not produce a clear majority (hung parliament). May barely managed to hold on to power with the help of Northern Ireland's extra-ministerial cooperation, and began negotiations with the EU on June 19 (Allen et al. 2017).

-> ta eulunem

Do you think that <b>as</b> a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU, unemployment <b>in</b> Britain will <b>be</b>	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot higher	239	11.21	11.21
A little higher	455	21.34	32.55
Won't make much difference	985	46.20	78.75
A little lower	336	15.76	94.51
A lot lower	117	5.49	100.00
Total	2,132	100.00	

-> ta eulimm

Do you think that <b>as</b> a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU, immigration to Britain will <b>be</b>	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
skip, <b>version off</b> route	1,002	25.13	25.13
skip, didn't return SC questionnaire	576	14.44	39.57
A lot higher	71	1.78	41.35
A little higher	145	3.64	44.98
Won't make much difference	872	21.87	66.85
A little lower	769	19.28	86.13
A lot lower	334	8.38	94.51
Can't choose	187	4.69	99.20
Not answered	32	0.80	100.00
Total	3,988	100.00	

-> ta eulecon

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Do you think that <b>as</b> a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU, Britain's economy will <b>be</b> better	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
skip, <b>version off</b> route	1,002	25.13	25.13
skip, didn't return SC questionnaire	576	14.44	39.57
A lot better <b>off</b>	212	5.32	44.88
A little better <b>off</b>	584	14.64	59.53
Won't make much difference	605	15.17	74.70
A little worse <b>off</b>	419	10.51	85.21
A lot worse <b>off</b>	327	8.20	93.41
Can't choose	232	5.82	99.22
Not answered	31	0.78	100.00
Total	3,988	100.00	

-> ta eulwork

Do you think that <b>as</b> a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU, it will be easier <b>for</b> people <b>in</b>	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
skip, <b>version off</b> route	1,002	25.13	25.13
skip, didn't return SC questionnaire	576	14.44	39.57
A lot easier	123	3.08	42.65
A little easier	561	14.07	56.72
Won't make much difference	904	22.67	79.39
A little harder	366	9.18	88.57
A lot harder	187	4.69	93.25
Can't choose	235	5.89	99.15
Not answered	34	0.85	100.00
Total	3,988	100.00	

-> ta eullowi

Do you think that <b>as</b> a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU, life <b>for</b> people <b>on</b> low incomes	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
skip, <b>version off</b> route	1,002	25.13	25.13
skip, didn't return SC questionnaire	576	14.44	39.57
A lot easier	58	1.45	41.02
A little easier	407	10.21	51.23
Won't make much difference	942	23.62	74.85
A little harder	408	10.23	85.08
A lot harder	304	7.62	92.70
Can't choose	260	6.52	99.22
Not answered	31	0.78	100.00
Total	3,988	100.00	

-&gt; ta eulmlow

Do you think that <b>as</b> a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU, there will <b>be more</b> people livin	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
skip, <b>version off</b> route	1,002	25.13	25.13
skip, didn't <b>return</b> SC questionnaire	576	14.44	39.57
A lot <b>more</b> people	226	5.67	45.24
A little <b>more</b> people	451	11.31	56.54
About the same amount <b>of</b> people	980	24.57	81.12
A little less people	376	9.43	90.55
A lot less people	74	1.86	92.40
Can't choose	273	6.85	99.25
Not answered	30	0.75	100.00
Total	3,988	100.00	

-&gt; ta eulnhs

Do you think that <b>as</b> a result <b>of</b> leaving the EU, the NHS will <b>be better in</b> 10 ye	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
skip, <b>version off</b> route	1,002	25.13	25.13
skip, didn't <b>return</b> SC questionnaire	576	14.44	39.57
A lot better	163	4.09	43.66
A little better	548	13.74	57.40
Won't make much difference	786	19.71	77.11
A little worse	333	8.35	85.46
A lot worse	332	8.32	93.78
Can't choose	218	5.47	99.25
Not answered	30	0.75	100.00
Total	3,988	100.00	

What will happen to unemployment as a result of leaving, what will happen to immigration, what will happen to the economy, how will low-income people live be, will low-income people increase, and, what will happen to the NHS situation, a series of items have been placed and correspond with the items in the 2015 BSA. Let's look at the changes.

3.2 Two years after Referendum, UK is still in EU: BSA 2018

-> ta WhBrxGd1

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> good <b>for</b> the NHS: More money available <b>for</b> government	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	107	40.07	40.07
Mentioned	160	59.93	100.00
Total	267	100.00	

-> ta WhBrxGd2

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> good <b>for</b> the NHS: More NHS jobs available <b>for</b> British	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	207	77.53	77.53
Mentioned	60	22.47	100.00
Total	267	100.00	

-> ta WhBrxGd3

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> good <b>for</b> the NHS: Goods like medicines and equipment	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	226	84.64	84.64
Mentioned	41	15.36	100.00
Total	267	100.00	

-> ta WhBrxGd4

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> good <b>for</b> the NHS: Fewer EU rules and regulations	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	165	61.80	61.80
Mentioned	102	38.20	100.00
Total	267	100.00	

-> ta WhBrxGd5

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> good <b>for</b> the NHS: Fewer non-British people <b>using</b> the	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	136	50.94	50.94
Mentioned	131	49.06	100.00
Total	267	100.00	



-&gt; ta WhBrxGd6

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> good <b>for</b> the NHS: More funding <b>for</b> things like medica	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	215	80.52	80.52
Mentioned	52	19.48	100.00
Total	267	100.00	

-&gt; ta WhBrxGd7

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> good <b>for</b> the NHS: Other	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	255	95.51	95.51
Mentioned	12	4.49	100.00
Total	267	100.00	

-&gt; ta WhBrxBa1

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> bad <b>for</b> the NHS: Less money available <b>for</b> government	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	197	57.43	57.43
Mentioned	146	42.57	100.00
Total	343	100.00	

-&gt; ta WhBrxBa2

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> bad <b>for</b> the NHS: More <b>difficult</b> to get NHS staff from	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	83	24.20	24.20
Mentioned	260	75.80	100.00
Total	343	100.00	

-&gt; ta WhBrxBa3

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> bad <b>for</b> the NHS: Goods like medicines and equipment w	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	153	44.61	44.61
Mentioned	190	55.39	100.00
Total	343	100.00	

-&gt; ta WhBrxBa4

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> bad <b>for</b> the NHS: Fewer EU rules and regulations	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	290	84.55	84.55
Mentioned	53	15.45	100.00
Total	343	100.00	

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-> ta WhBrxBa5

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> bad <b>for</b> the NHS: Restrictions <b>on</b> non-British people u	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	271	79.01	79.01
Mentioned	72	20.99	100.00
Total	343	100.00	

-> ta WhBrxBa6

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> bad <b>for</b> the NHS: Less funding <b>for</b> things like medical	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	177	51.60	51.60
Mentioned	166	48.40	100.00
Total	343	100.00	

-> ta WhBrxBa7

Why leaving the EU will <b>be</b> bad <b>for</b> the NHS: Other	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not mentioned	329	95.92	95.92
Mentioned	14	4.08	100.00
Total	343	100.00	

When asked why leaving the EU would be good for the NHS, references to “More money available for governments to spend on the NHS,” “More NHS jobs available for British people,” “Goods like medicines and equipment will cost less,” “Fewer EU rules and regulations,” “fFewer non-British people using the NHS,” and “More funding for things like medical research,” (multiple answers allowed) respectively, were, 59.9%, 22.5%, 15.4%, 38.2%, 49.1% and 19.5%. When crossed with the choices made during the referendum, there is a strong relationship between remain/leave and the number of immigrants desired, indicating that slogans heard during the referendum campaign, such as the use of financial resources made available by leaving the EU and the reduction of welfare spent for foreigners, have had no small impact.

For multiple-answer questions asking why leaving the EU would be good for the NHS, references to individual answers “More money available for

governments to spend on the NHS,” “More NHS jobs available for British people,” “Goods like medicines and equipment will cost less,” “Fewer EU rules and regulations,” “Fewer non-British people using the NHS,” and “More funding for things like medical research” can be counted. The respective percentages that each of the reasons mentioned were, 59.9%, 22.5%, 15.4%, 38.2%, 49.1%, and 19.5%. When crossed with the choices made in the referendum, there is still a strong link between remain/leave and the number of immigrants desired, revealing that slogans heard during the referendum campaign, such as the use of financial resources made available by leaving the EU and the reduction of welfare spent on foreigners, have had no small impact. The same is true for the question item asking respondents to give reasons for “why leaving the EU would be bad for the NHS.” The percentages are, 42.6%, 75.8%, 55.4%, 15.5%, and 21.0%, respectively. This is not symmetrical with the “good” reasons.

## Conclusion

We are well aware that this paper merely confirms what is already known to some extent. By looking at the BSA data, which contains questions that are not often used in political analysis and do not necessarily overlap with the BES, we hope to provide some insight into British society’s expectations (and, given more time, satisfaction or disappointment) regarding Brexit. Finally, we’d like to mention social stratification. We should have considered how the social (economic) stratification affected each of the things we have examined so far, but unfortunately, we did not have enough time left.

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