| ID | 41549 |
| JaLCDOI | |
| Sort Key | 5
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| Title Alternative | Strategic Games and R&D Investment with Spillovers
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| FullText URL | |
| Author |
Haruna, Shoji
Kaken ID
researchmap
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| Abstract | The paper considers the problem of whether in a strategic two-stage game duopolistic firms make an overinvestment or underinvestment in R & D when there are their spillovers. We deal with two cases of Cournot quantity and Bertrand price competitions. It is shown that in Cournot (Bertrand) competition each firm has an incentive to use a larger (less) or less (larger) investment than the one required to minimize the costs of investment according as its rival's spillover rate is relatively small or large.
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| Note | 論説 (Article)
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| Publication Title |
岡山大学経済学会雑誌
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| Published Date | 1999-03-10
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| Volume | volume30
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| Issue | issue3
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| Publisher | 岡山大学経済学会
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| Publisher Alternative | The Economic Association of Okayama University
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| Start Page | 107
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| End Page | 124
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| ISSN | 0386-3069
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| NCID | AN00032897
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| Content Type |
Journal Article
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| OAI-PMH Set |
岡山大学
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| language |
Japanese
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| File Version | publisher
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| NAID | |
| Eprints Journal Name | oer
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