Okayama Economic Review
Published by the Economic Association of Okayama University

Online ISSN 2433-4146
Print ISSN 0386-3069

戦略的ゲームとスピルオーバー下のR&D投資

春名 章二 岡山大学
抄録
The paper considers the problem of whether in a strategic two-stage game duopolistic firms make an overinvestment or underinvestment in R & D when there are their spillovers. We deal with two cases of Cournot quantity and Bertrand price competitions. It is shown that in Cournot (Bertrand) competition each firm has an incentive to use a larger (less) or less (larger) investment than the one required to minimize the costs of investment according as its rival's spillover rate is relatively small or large.
備考
論説 (Article)
ISSN
0386-3069
NCID
AN00032897