The Political Situation in Northeast China
in the Second Half of the 1940s

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I  Introduction

Regional cooperation and symbiosis for the mutual prosperity in the Far East are quite hard because of negative legacies of World War II and the Cold War. This paper aims to clarify the final stage of WWII and the Chinese Civil War (CWW) in northeast China in the second half of the 1940s. This work is very important to understand present complicated socioeconomic situations in the area.

II  Surrender of Japan and Occupation by the USSR in northeast China

Even after the surrender of Manchukuo and Japan, the battle in northeast China continued until November 1948. The war process was entangled. It was the most important strategic task for both of the Nationalists and the Communists immediately after WWII to control northeast China for two reasons. The first reason was abundant reserves of mining resources and advanced equipment of heavy industries based on those resources. The second reason was stock of Japanese weapons and Chinese soldiers which Japanese army had brought in and organized to maintain Manchukuo.

8 of August 1945, the USSR declared war against Japan, and set up a lightning attack. Soviet troops attempted quick advance to retain an advantageous diplomatic condition against the US. As a matter of fact, Soviet troops easily swept the Japanese army in two weeks. Important cities of northeast China, including Dalian (大连) and Ryushun (旅顺, Port Arthur) in the south end of Liaodong(遼東) peninsula, were occupied by late August.
Advance of Soviet troops made the political situation in the northeast entangled. This is because the USSR carried through her China policy negotiating with both the Nationalists and the Communists. The USSR ideologically confronted with the Nationalists. Soviet troops helped the Communists, for examples, handling the weapons of the Japanese army to them, and interfering with advance of the Nationalists into the northeast. On the other hand, The USSR admitted the National government as an official Chinese government, considering the military ascendency of the Nationalists and the powerful China policy of the US.

The USSR and the National government sit at table to discuss their formal diplomatic relation in June 1945, and concluded the Sino-Soviet Peace Treaty in August. In the treaty, the USSR agreed “to give the National government of China moral and material support and moreover formalized their assurances of non interference in Chinese internal affairs” (US Department of States (1968), p.126). It is also worth to noting that Joseph V. Stalin conceived Mao Zedong (毛沢東) as “margarine communists” or “white radish with red skin”. Stalin actually attached little importance to Mao’s movement, and praised Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) leadership (Matsuba (1969), p.264, Tang (1963), p.163, and Xu (1993), p.248). Those factors, i.e., the Sino-Soviet Peace Treaty and the Stalin’s view, often changed the China policy of the USSR as explained later.

The National government in Chongqing (重慶, Chungking) and the Communist leaders in Yanan (延安) started to grope their post war policy in late August 1945. Chiang Kai-shek proposed Mao Zedong to discuss the post war matters in Chongqing. Under the pressure from Moscow to Yan-an and the guarantee of Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, the US ambassador, and Gen. Wedemeyer, the commander of the US China theatre, regarding safety of Mao Zedong during his stay in Chongqing, Mao Zedong accepted the offer from Chiang-Kai-shek. In consequence of 43 day negotiation, Chiang-Kai-shek and Mao Zedong concluded the October 10 Treaty, Suanshi Xieiding (雙十協定), for truce (Matsuba (1969), PP.318, and Xu (1993), pp.136-8). The battle areas of the CCW, however, were enlarged during the diplomatic bargaining. Both the Nationalists and the Communists opened new fronts in Hebei (河北), Henan (河南), Shandong (山東), and Inner Mongol (內蒙古), to take advantages at the negotiation. The Nationalists won some battles, however, lost some also (Lee Yingzhu ed. (1995), pp.1402-9, and Shao, Wang and Liu ed. (1988), p.206). The future of the CCW became opaque.

The situation of the northeast was different from China proper, Guan-nai (關內), and Inner Mongol. There was no direct military struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists in
August and September 1945. The Communists took the initiative in moving into the northeast. In June 1942, resistance groups based in Siberia that had escaped from the Japanese army in Manchukuo, were reorganized as the 88th International Brigade, Donbei Kanri Lianjun Jiaodaopai (東北抗日聯軍教導派). Zho Baozhong (周保中), the commander of the brigade, cooperated with the lightening attack operation of Soviet troops and brought back his own troops to northeast China (Hiramatsu (1988), pp.54-61, and Kashima (1990), p.156). The brigade was, in fact, subjected to strong influence of Soviet troops during the operation. However, it was reorganized and put under the command of Yan-an in late October 1945 (Xu (1993), pp.112-7, and Liu (1997), p.8). Promotion speed for Zho Baozhong became slower after the rearrangement compared with other generals sent from Yan-an, for examples, Lin Piao (林彪), Bao Zhen (彭真), Lu Zhengcao (呂正操) (Hiramatsu (1988), pp.54-61, and Shao & Wang & Liu (1988), p.137).

Beside the advance of the 88th International Brigade, vanguards of the Communists were sent from China proper in late August and beginning of September 1945. Catching the news concerning the advance of the Chinese communists, on 14 September, Marshal Malinovsky, the commander of Soviet troops in the Far East, sent a message to Yan-an. Marshal Malinovsky advised Yan-an to withdraw the Chinese vanguards from the northeast. Facing the pressure from the USSR, hot argument happened in the Communists. However, considering the contents of Sino-Soviet Peace Treaty, Yan-an finally decided to use new names for vanguards, hiding its original ones, and kept sending additional vanguards (Xu, (1993), pp.145-9, and Liu, (1997), pp.26-9). On 19 September, Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhengzhi-ju (政治局), determined to keep dispatching bands toward the northeast and to defend south and middle China. The new operation was named ‘Dispatching into the Northeast, Defending the South Strategy’ (Ishi (1990), pp.22-3). Additional troops were expedited in the following months in spite of the pressure from the USSR.

Substantial advance of the Communists, however, stimulated the Nationalists. On 5 November, Xiong Shihui (熊式辉), director of Generalissimo’s Northeast Headquarters, Donbei Xingying (東北行营), criticized Marshal Malinovsky his acquiescence for advance of the Communists. On 15 November, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed for President Truman, and the US replied him by dispatching two armies to Shandong to put the Communists in the province under their control. After this military reaction of the US, the USSR suddenly changed her China policy that had tacitly admitted the advance of Yan-an troops (Xu, (1997), pp.165-6). On 19 November, the
Soviet troops demanded the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhonggong Dongbei-ju (中共東北局), to withdraw from principal cities, e.g., Shenyang (瀋陽), Dalian and others in the northeast. Yan-an was finally forced to accept the demand from Moscow to give way to Chongqing. After withdrawal from those cities, however, the Communists did not move back to China proper. They were ordered from Yan-an to go into rural districts to build up their military bases. The new strategy was named by the CCP as 'Abandoning Main Gate, but Securing Both Eaves’, Rangkai Dalu, Zhanling Lianxian (讓開大路，佔領兩廂) (Liu (1997), pp.84-7, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefang-jun Tongjian Bianji Weiyuan-hui ed., (1997), p.1133, Tang Peiji ed., (1997), p.477).

The National government in Chongqing designed the basic principles, Xufu Donbei Geshang Churi Banfa Yaogang (修復東北各省處理辦法要綱), to reconstruct the administrative structures of the northeast on 31 August 1945. On 1 September, according to the program, the National government additionally decided to found the Generalissimo’s Northeast Headquarters, in Changchun (長春) (Zhu ed., (1993), pp.905-8, Ishii (1990), p.27, Kashima (1990), p.255, and Levine (1987), p.47). Notwithstanding these immediate behaviours, the advance of the Nationalists was delay nearly two months compared with the Communists.

The Sino-Soviet Peace Treaty expressed in its aide-memoire that withdrawal of Soviet troops would be accomplished within three month after the defeat of Japan. Chiang Kai-shek and Foreign Ministry of the National government made much of the conclusion of the treat, even they still held some apprehensions for binding force of the treaty on the USSR. Xiong Shihui, director of the Generalissimo’s Northeast Headquarters, optimistically believed until late September that Soviet troops would retreat to the USSR following the treaty. There was also another restriction for the National government to dispatch its troops to the northeast. Large naval vessels were necessary to transport heavily armed troops. The National government, however, did not hold its own fleets (Zhu Hanguo ed. (1993), pp.901-3, Ishii (1990), p.27, and Kashima (1990), pp.154-5, 255-6). At length, in the middle of October, the Nationalists demanded Soviet troops to admit to carry the Nationalists troops to Dalian using the fleets of the US. The demand was nonchalantly denied by Soviet troops. In the same time, Soviet troops offered to use the port of Yingko (營口) for Dalian, and substantially prohibited the advance of the Nationalists by turning over the control of Yingko to the Communists.

On 7 October 1945, Dong Yanping (董彥平), vice director of Generalissimo’s Northeast Headquarters, arrived in Changchun from Beijing by air with his some 40 staff (Dong, (1982), p.25). Guan Luzhen (關麟征), supreme commander of Northeast Public Peace, Donbei Baoan (東
North China), Xiong Shihui, director of Generalissimo’s Northeast Headquarters, and Jiang Jinguo (蒋经国) (a son of Chiang Kai-shek), a special representative of Foreign Ministry, followed Dong Yanping. Generalissimo’s Northeast Headquarters eventually completed its staff and organization in Changchun, and set up diplomatic negotiation with Soviet troops (Zhu Hanguo ed. (1993), pp.910-1). The negotiation of the Nationalists and Soviet troops lasted until the beginning of February 1946. Main demand of the Nationalist during the diplomacy was the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Soviet troops requested the Nationalists to accept the joint undertaking plan to develop economy of northeast China. On the other hand, Soviet troops had started their confiscation program in some industrial areas in September 1945 (Table 1). A point of compromise between the Nationalists and Soviet troops was hard to be found from the beginning, and the negotiation reached the rupture after all in February 1946 (Nishimura (1985), Yamamoto (1986), and Tabata (1990)).

### Table 1 Damage of Confiscation by Soviet Troops in Northeast China

Estimated by Pauley Mission and Detained Japanese Engineers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>by Pauley Mission</th>
<th></th>
<th>by detained Japanese engineers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removed</td>
<td>Damaged Capacity</td>
<td>Removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,000US$</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1,000US$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Power</td>
<td>201,000</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>219,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Mining</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>44,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron &amp; Steel</td>
<td>131,260</td>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>204,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>221,390</td>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>193,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>158,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid Fuel</td>
<td>11,380</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>74,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**59,056</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ferrous</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>60,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>135,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp &amp; Paper</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*R. &amp; C.&amp; T.</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>20-100</td>
<td>4,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>895,030</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,233,164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Asterisked words mean as follows; * Radio & Communication & Telephone, ** Chemical Industry, *** Food Industry.

Sources: See Matsumoto(2000), Chapter 4, p.168.
The US kept giving large amount of military aids to the National government since the period of the Pacific War. In the last stage of the war, however, the US diplomats in China increased their discontent against the National government, and criticized the pro-Nationalists China policy of the Department of States. The diplomats concerned that the aids from the US were not used for anti Japan operation but reserved in anticipation of the final stage of the CCW. The argument among diplomats could not change the China policy of the US. However, tangled ill feeling among the staff of American embassy remained even after the defeat of Japan (Tang Tsou (1963), pp.195-196, 200-1, 298, Matsuba (1969), p.258, 277, and Nagai (1978), pp.127-30).

At V-J-day in 1945, the US were convinced of military advantage of the Nationalists against the Communists, as the USSR was. Volume of hard currency held by the National government, was estimated "at least several hundred million United States dollars", recorded the highest level in its history. The National government also occupied the provinnces in China proper, for example, the coastal area of river Yangzi, where a lot of revenue existed. Being helped by the Sino Soviet Peace Treaty and the locations of northeast China and Taiwan, the US could optimistically forecasted seizure of the northeast districts by the Nationalists (Dept. of States (1949), pp.129-30).

In autumn of 1945, however, the US changed her China policy, and dared to take more flexible diplomatic behaviour to recommend the National government a compromise with the Communists to a certain extent. Analysing the aspects of the CCW mentioned above, the US judged that it is impossible for the National government to gain a victory in a short term. The US also concluded that if the National government kept its resolute military attack against the Chinese Communist Party, it might bring the consequence of bankruptcy of the national budget and chaos of Chinese society. The US feared that influence of the CCP spread under such confused situation.

The US sent armies to Shandong to assist the Nationalists in autumn 1945 (Levine (1987), p.48, Nagai (1978), pp.200-1, and Tang ed. (1997), pp.472-3). On the other hand, on 27 November 1945, facing uncertain aspects of the CCW, President Truman discharged Patrick J. Hurley, China ambassador, who mislead the situation of the CCW and freshly sent Gen. George Marshall, later States Secretary, as the Special Representative of the President to Chongqing. Truman "asked the General to bring to bear the influence of the United States to the end that the 'unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods' might be achieved as soon as possible and concurrently to endeavour to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in the North China". Marshall was "authorized to speak Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders 'with the utmost
frankness’ and state that ‘a China disunited and torn by civil strife’ was not a proper place for American economic assistance in the form of credits or technical assistance nor for American military aid’ (Dept. of States (1949), pp.132, 605-9).

5 January 1946, the Committee of Three composed of Gen. Zhang Zhilian, representative of the National government, Zho Enlai (周恩来, Chou En-lai), representative of the CCP, and Marshall, was founded. The representatives discussed the reduction of armaments at the committee. On 2 February, they agreed the Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army (Zhu Guohan ed. (1993), pp.929-30, Meng ed. (1989), pp.1024-95, and Gillin & Myers ed. (1989), pp.26-7). Following the discussing process, Dairy Liberation, Jiefang Ribao, a Communist newspaper, dated 11 of January 1946, declared that “the new stage of peace and democracy” came true. Despite the fact, Yan-an did not abandon to send its additional troops to the northeast (Ishii (1990), pp.118, 123-7), because the National government was preparing to reinforce the troops to the northeast. Only three days after the conclusion of the basis above, the CCP commanded Linpiao and Peng Zhen of the Northeast Bureau a new operation to counterattack the reinforcement of the Nationalists (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Tongjian Bianji Weiyuan-hui ed. (1987), pp.1146-7). Actually, both the Nationalists and the Communists did not respect the basis.

It is worth paying attention to that the US helped reinforcement of the Nationalists by providing vessels. Yan-an “protested the further transportation of Chinese Government armies into Manchuria”. Facing the protest from the CCP, the US replied that “the limitation of Government troops in Manchuria — was not effective until the end of 12 months and that the movement of National Government armies into Manchuria had been authorized by the cessation of hostilities order of January 10” (Dept. of States 1949, pp.140-1, 149). Getting assist from the US and compromise of the USSR, the National government continuously and successfully reinforced its forces in the northeast in 1946.

III Withdrawal of the USSR and Expansion of the CCW

— the Offence of the Nationalists —

From the end of 1945 to the beginning of 1946, Marshall repeatedly proposed the ceasefire at the Committee of Three. In spite of his endeavour, the situation of the CCW was not settled. The Communists accepted Marshall’s proposals, but the Nationalists denied them. The Department of States described the attitude of the National government as follows; “At this stage the National
Government seemed determined to incur no restriction on its freedom of action in Manchuria and bent on a policy of complete military occupation of the area and elimination of the Chinese Communist forces —, even though it did not have the military capability of achieving these objectives” (Dept. of States (1949), p.146). Dept. of States (1949) pointed out an aggressive attitude of the Nationalists at the committee. However, it neglected and hid the responsibility of the US that encouraged the Nationalists to be aggressive.

In spite of the forecast of the US concerning the limit of Nationalists’ military power, cities and areas occupied by the Nationalists increased. The Nationalists founded the new local governments in Changchun, Harbin, Siping, Jiheteru, Shenyang and others in December 1945 and January 1946 (Dong (1982), pp.80-2, 91-2). These advances and foundations were achieved under agreement of Soviet troops. The Nationalists became dominant for the Communists in January, and also for the USSR in March 1946.

Soviet troops delayed its retreat at least three times. The first delay was proposed by the National government in October 1945. Because, the Nationalist was anxious about that immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops might make a good chance for the Communists to occupy principal cities. The second case happened in January-February 1946. During this period, Soviet troops still pursued for the joint economic developing plan with the Nationalists. Soviet troops used the condition of withdrawal as a useful bargaining card to draw out advantage from the National government. The third case was made in March 1946. The delay was schemed by Soviet troops to assist the Communists, giving it time and weapons to succeed their occupations of Changchun, Siping and other main cities. For this purpose, on 5 March, Malinovsky suggested his men further delay of withdrawal (Ishii (1990), p.43, Dong (1982), pp.17, 33, 53, 123, and Tang ed. (1997), p.481). Three time delays were done for each different reason.

In the middle of March 1946, Soviet troops suddenly started withdrawal. One reason for the withdrawal was the split of the diplomatic negotiation with the National government regarding the joint economic developing plan. There was, however, another larger background behind the behaviour. On 9 March, the Department of States strongly criticised the USSR for delayed withdrawal from northeast China. In the same time, crisis of the Cold War also became serious in Europe. It was the symbolic affair showing the critical international situation in the period that Winston Churchill, former prime minister of the UK, did the Fulton Speech, “Speech of Iron Curtain”, at Westminster College in Missouri on 5 March. The USSR abruptly reduced its non-European fronts, Northeast China, Iran etc. (Levine (1987), pp.74, 78-9).
Direct hard battles between the Nationalists and the Communists became harder in the northeast China in 1946. In the late of March, 5 armies 11 divisions of the Nationalists attacked Siping. The battle became full-scaled in the middle of April (Battle of Baowei-Siping, 保衛四平戰役). Soviet troops left behind Japanese weapons for the Communists when they retreated. Getting heavy weapons, the Communists fought against the Nationalists staying in Siping, throwing off ist strategy, “Abandoning Main Gate, but Securing Both Eaves”, i.e., without taking guerrilla operations, and was seriously defeated (Liu (1997), pp.188-9, Dong (1982), p.171, Levine (1987), pp.98-100, and Ishii (1990), pp.133-4).

On 3 May, Soviet troops declared completion of withdrawal from the northeast. Actually, Soviet troops still remained in the northern part of Mudanjian (牡丹江), however, Moscow’s military hegemony was basically disappeared at this point. The Nationalists became vigorous and the Communists fell in low spirits after the Battle of Baowei-Siping. Nevertheless, the fronts in the northeast were deadlocked in May. This is because difficulty of logistics for the Nationalists, and guerrilla warfare of the Communists restarted in the southern part of northeast China (Liu (1997), pp.198-201).

In June 1946, 15-day truce arrangement was agreed between the Nationalists and the Communists. The deadline of cease-fire fixed by this agreement was delayed to the end of June, and concluded another delay on 1 July. Discussion during the truce period was, however, unsuccessful. Facing the deadlock of the truce arrangement, the US eventually stopped exporting weapons from the US to the National government on 25 July 1946, and also from the Pacific area in the middle of August 1946 (Dept. of States (1949), pp.354-5). However, the Nationalists, already getting ‘adequate’ weapons, strengthened their military operation in both China proper and northeast China, even after the change of the US China policy. General Marshall’s draft plan for ceasefire was rejected by the Nationalists at the Committee of Three, as it had been in February (Dept of States (1949), pp.156-70). In the meantime, the National government moved the capital from Chongqing to Nanjing to appeal its recovery from the chaos of anti Japan war.

In October 1946, the Nationalists attacked the last major military base, Nan-man Genjuti, of the Communists remained in the mountain areas closing to the boarder between China and Korea (Lee Ying ed. (1995), pp.1446-8). Territory of the Communists was shrunk by the attack. Thrown into inferiority situation, the Communists sent reinforcements from the northern part of the northeast, and also strengthened its guerrilla operation again. Battle of Sanxia Jiangnan Sibao
Linjiang (三下江南、四保臨江) was the rescue operation of the Communists for the base. Defence operation combined with diversion was successful. (Liu (1997), pp.291-7, Zhongguo Renmin Geming Bowuguan ed. (1987), p.159, and Jinjicha Wenyi Yanju-hui ed. (1992), p.51). However, by the November 1946, the Nationalist “had occupied most of the areas covered by its demands to the Chinese Communists in June and during later negotiation and had reached what turned out to be the highest point of its military position” (Dept. of States (1949), p.181). The negotiation at the Committee of Three came to a deadlock in this situation. Zho Enlai requested General Marshall to carry the representatives of the Communists from Nanjing by the US military plane, and left for Yan-an on 19 November 1946. The Committee of Three for the truce arrangement set up in January 1946 closed its historical role. Inferiority in the Communists lasted until the next spring in 1947.

On 1 December 1946, Chiang Kai-shek told General Marshall his forecast that the Nationalist would sweep the Communists within eight or ten months. President Truman called back Marshall and requested him to take up the post of States Secretary in January 1948. Disappointed Marshall left Nanjing for the US on 8 January 1947, suspecting the optimistic prospect of Chiang Kai-shek (Dept. of States (1949), pp.217-20).

IV Termination of the CCW — the Offensive of the Communists —

Aspect of the CCW was reversed in May 1947. The turning point was the Summer Attack (夏季攻勢) of the Communists. Following the attack, the Communists executed the Autumn Attack (秋季攻勢) in September, then the Winter Attack (冬季攻勢) in December in the same year. The territory of the Nationalists in northeast China was diminished to 14% after the Autumn Attack, and to only 3% after the Winter Attack. After this series of attacks, seesaw battles were repeated for six months.


The US confusedly analysed the situation of the CCW during the Summer Attack and reviewed her China policy again. The US restarted exportation of weapons to the National
government in May 1947. Following the advice of States Secretary Gen. Marshall, ex-Special Representative of the President, Truman sent Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer to China to inspect the aspect. According to the report of Wedemeyer, the US decided to prepare the additional financial aids to the National government, avoiding direct reinforcement from the US. The negotiation lasted a few months, and became in shape as the China Aid Act on 2, April 1948 (Dept. of States (1949), pp.255-60, 269-271, 354-7, 360, 387-99). However, when the China Aid Act was substantially mobilised in 1948, the Winter Attack had been already completed, and the Nationalists troops were driven into three cities, Shenyang, Changchun, and Jinzho. Under the overwhelming favourable situation for the Communists, possibility for another ceasefire in the northeast was completely disappeared.

V Conclusion

Japanese army left considerable number of weapons and soldiers. Northeast China was also economically important for natural resources and established industries. Military importance and outstanding economic worth of the northeast became great concern among the Nationalists, the Communists and the USSR.

The USSR supported Yan-an by prohibiting the Nationalists to use Dalian and Ryushun, and by delivering the weapons, which the Japanese army had left behind, to the Communists after the surrender of Japan. The US kept giving huge financial and military aids to the Nationalists since the period of WWII. Both super powers, however, repeatedly forced their ideological partners to compromise with the rivals. The USSR concluded the Sino-Soviet Peace Treaty with the National government in August 1945, believing the victory of the Nationalists, and sought after joint developing plans for the northeast with it. This treaty forbade the USSR to assist the Communists. The USSR also feared the deep commitment of the US to the northeast. Because of these restrictions, The USSR ordered the Communists to retreat from important cities and areas where Soviet troops occupied. On the other hand, Yan-an’s strong resistance against the Chongqing lead the US to arbitrate between two Chinese parties, the Nationalists and the Communists. The US feared bankruptcy of the National government and disintegration of the Chinese society, in order to prevent Chinese from accepting the Communists as a new leader.

The US proposed the Nationalists and the Communists truce arrangement. The Committee of Three organized by General Marshall was the typical trial for the purpose. During the negotiation at the Committee of Three, the US kept giving military aids and exporting weapons to make the Nationalists’ position in the committee stronger until July 1946. Being helped by the assists, the
Nationalists gained the military power and became negative to the negotiation. It was an unexpected and ironical result for the US. The US stopped military exportation in summer 1946. However, even after the revise of the US China policy, resoluteness of the national government was not changed, encouraged by their successful military operations.

The attack of the Nationalists, however, was held by the Communists at the Battle of Sanxia-Jiannan-Sibao-Linjiang in March 1947. Then in 1948, the military hegemony was turned over from the Nationalists to the Communists through the Summer Attack, the Autumn Attack, and Winter Attack of the Communists. The US reviewed her China policy and enforced financial aids for the National government again. However, the military situation of the Nationalists already became hopeless before the refurbished aids brought the effective assist on the battle. In November of 1948, Battle of Liaooshen finally concluded the victory of the Communists in the northeast.

The CCP gained conclusive advantage upon the Nationalists in the beginning of 1949, winning Battle of Junhai (淮海战役) and Battle of Pingjing (平津战役). Those two battles and the Battle of Liaooshen are the three major battles in the CCW. Following the final victory of the CCP in October 1949, i.e., establishment of People's Republic of China, Korean War broke out in June 1950. The United Nations adopted the US proposal and decided to send the Allied Forces to Korean peninsula. PRC also participated in the war in October 1950. The UN put a strategic embargo against PRC in February 1951. The US concluded the Sino-US Treaty with Republic of China in June 1950, and signed up the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty with Japan in 1951 as well, to reconstruct her hegemony in the Far East. On the other hand, military and economic relations between PRC and the USSR were rapidly strengthened in 1950 and 1951. The First Five Year Plan supported by the USSR started in 1953, under these circumstances. This whole process was a drastic rearrangement of international relations into the age of the Cold War in the Far East.

[Reference]


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Toshiro MATSUMOTO


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