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ID 40590
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Abstract
This paper considers whether firms have incentives to disclose their R&D information to their rivals in Cournot−quantity setting and Bertrand−price setting models. Furthermore, we compare market performances, e.g. R&D investments, prices and profits, in these models. It is shown that whether they have such incentives depends only on the signs of cross−price effects in demand functions, irrespective of the type of competition, e.g. Cournot or Bertrand competition. When making comparisons of them among four modes, we find that the formation of R&D cartels tends to increase the expenditure of R&D investment and then gains more profits. Alternatively, we point out that quantity−setting firms gain more profits in the presence of R&D cooperation than in the absence of it when products are substitutes in terms of Cournot competition.
Note
論説 (Article)
Published Date
2004-03-10
Publication Title
岡山大学経済学会雑誌
Publication Title Alternative
Okayama Economic Review
Volume
volume35
Issue
issue4
Publisher
岡山大学経済学会
Publisher Alternative
The Economic Association of Okayama University
Start Page
1
End Page
25
ISSN
0386-3069
NCID
AN00032897
Content Type
Journal Article
language
日本語
File Version
publisher
Refereed
True
Eprints Journal Name
oer