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ID 40487
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Abstract
This paper considers a dynamic commons game in relation with mitigation of invasive alien species such as nutria in Okayama. In our commons game, players (trappers) non−cooperatively seek to maximize their own payoff by extracting the renewable resource stock (nutria). One key assumption is that the cost of extraction of the resource is negatively related to the current stock level. For a low level of resource stock, the extraction cost is high, which makes the extraction less lucrative for the players and which in turn stimulates the renewable resource stock to regenerate more rapidly. As the resource stock reaches a high level, the reverse process will start, and this can cause oscillating behaviors. Our simple model proposed here exemplifies that an increase in the number of players can drastically change the qualitative as well as quantitative features of the dynamics for the renewable resource stock.
Note
研究ノート (Note)
Published Date
2005-06-10
Publication Title
岡山大学経済学会雑誌
Publication Title Alternative
Okayama Economic Review
Volume
volume37
Issue
issue1
Publisher
岡山大学経済学会
Publisher Alternative
The Economic Association of Okayama University
Start Page
53
End Page
61
ISSN
0386-3069
NCID
AN00032897
Content Type
Journal Article
Related Url
http://www.e.okayama-u.ac.jp/gakkai/
language
英語
File Version
publisher
Refereed
True
Eprints Journal Name
oer